The Rosario-Wang Proof

Eni6ma Technology and the Rosario-Wang Proof/Cypher is Patent Pending. USPTO 2024. Copyright 2024 All right reserved. Eni6ma.org - Dylan Rosario


The Rosario-Wang Proofs, are a comprehensive suite of mathematical proofs across various methodologies including [1] Direct, Probabilistic via Induction, Accumulation of results, and proof by Contradiction, which collectively underscore the multifaceted rigor and robustness embedded in the cryptographic protocol ΠΠ. At the core of these proofs lies the objective of ΠΠ to authenticate a sequence PP through a meticulous process of verification against a dynamically shuffled alphabet XRX^R across numerous rounds. The direct proof initiates this exploration by asserting the fundamental logic and operational structure of ΠΠ, demonstrating how the accumulator ΛΛ signifies the complete authentication of PP when every element pip_i is verified within its assigned subset xiRx_i^R for all rounds. This proof not only highlights ΠΠ's thorough authentication process but also its capacity to safeguard the integrity and authenticity of PP.

Building on this foundation, the probabilistic proof via induction introduces a layer of complexity by weaving in the principles of probability and mathematical induction. It posits that with each subsequent round, the likelihood of ΛΛ accurately representing the authentication of PP markedly increases, presupposing a verification process characterized by security and impartiality. This aspect of the Rosario-Wang Proofs illustrates the dynamic and adaptable nature of ΠΠ's verification mechanism, emphasizing its capability to consistently authenticate sequences amidst a landscape marked by variability and uncertainty.

The accumulation of results proof further solidifies the authentication framework of ΠΠ by meticulously analyzing how ΛΛ, through the logical aggregation (\bigwedge) of all verification outcomes M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R), serves as an unequivocal metric of PP's authentication across all rounds. This proof methodically navigates through ΠΠ's verification process, affirming that the truth of ΛΛ is a comprehensive reflection of successful individual verifications and, by extension, the holistic authentication of PP within ΠΠ's verification spectrum.

Complementing these proofs, the proof by contradiction employs a logical exploration of potential contradictions to reinforce the theorem that ΛΛ truthfully signifies PP's authentication. By examining hypothetical scenarios where ΛΛ could misrepresent the authentication status of PP, this proof navigates through logical inconsistencies to affirm the original theorem's validity, thereby highlighting the coherence and structural integrity of ΠΠ's verification system.

Together, these proofs constitute a detailed validation framework for ΠΠ, offering a nuanced perspective on its approach to sequence authentication. From establishing the foundational logic and operational integrity to exploring probabilistic certainties and addressing potential logical contradictions, the Rosario-Wang Proofs not only substantiate ΠΠ's theoretical and practical reliability but also underscore its innovative contributions to the realm of cryptographic authentication. Through this comprehensive proof suite, ΠΠ is demonstrated to authenticate sequences with a high degree of certainty, security, and adaptability, reflecting its significance within the cryptographic landscape.

The disclosed proofs within this chapter offer a detailed validation framework utilizing the following methods :

Shuffling Function (Σ\Sigma): By mapping a static alphabet AA onto a shuffled alphabet XRX^R for each round RR, ensuring each verification round has a unique configuration.

Σ:AXR\quad \Sigma: A \rightarrow X^R

Subset Indication (Ω\Omega): For every element pip_i in the sequence PP, a specific subset xiRx_i^R within XRX^R is identified for verification purposes, establishing the basis for each element's validation.

M(pi)=xiR\quad M(p_i) = x_i^R

Element Verification (MM): The verification function MM assesses whether each element pip_i is correctly located within its designated subset xiRx_i^R, with verification success explicitly contingent upon the element's presence within the subset.

M(pi,xiR)=true    pixiR\quad M(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} \iff p_i \in x_i^R

Result Accumulation (Λ\Lambda): Aggregates the outcomes of all verification efforts across rounds through logical conjunction, encapsulating the collective success of element verifications.

Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)\quad \Lambda = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} M(p_i, x_i^R)

Probabilistic Result Accumulation (Λnew\Lambda_{\text{new}}): Enhances the accumulation process by considering the probability of each verification's success, factoring in the conditions and round-specific contexts, thereby offering a nuanced view of the verification integrity.

Λnew=R=1nPr(M(pi,xiR)=truexiR,R)\quad \Lambda_{\text{new}} = \prod_{R=1}^{n} \Pr(M(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} | x_i^R, R)

Authentication Conclusion (KΛK \Leftrightarrow \Lambda): Establishes the final authentication status of PP, equating the proof of knowledge (KK) directly with the truth of the accumulated verification results (Λ\Lambda), thereby affirming the sequence's authentication when the verification process consistently succeeds across all rounds.

KΛ\quad K \Leftrightarrow \Lambda

The given equations form a comprehensive mathematical framework for a cryptographic protocol, detailing the process from initial setup through to the final verification outcome:. Together, these equations systematically articulate the protocol's methodology for authenticating a sequence PP against a dynamically shuffled alphabet XRX^R, incorporating both deterministic and probabilistic elements to ensure rigorous and comprehensive sequence authentication.

Description of Π

Given:

  • A static alphabet AA,

  • A sequence P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\} designated for authentication,

  • A per-round uniquely shuffled alphabet XR=Σ(A)X^R = Σ(A), and

  • A verification procedure for elements piPp_i \in P against subsets xiRXRx_i^R \subseteq X^R.

Operations and Verification Logic:

  1. Shuffling:

    • For each verification round RR, AA undergoes transformation into a shuffled variant XRX^R via ΣΣ, where Σ:AXRΣ: A \rightarrow X^R, imbuing each round with distinctiveness.

  2. Subset Indication:

    • The indicating function ΩΩ, for each pip_i, delineates the subset xiRx_i^R within XRX^R designated for pip_i's verification, forming the verification challenge foundation for round RR. Thus, Ω(pi)=xiRΩ(p_i) = x_i^R.

  3. Element Verification:

    • Verification of pip_i's inclusion within xiRx_i^R is executed via MΜ, where M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} iff pip_i is ascertained within xiRx_i^R.

  4. Result Accumulation:

    • Cumulative verification over all rounds RR is consolidated by ΛΛ, the logical conjunction of all verification results: Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R).

  5. Authentication Outcome:

    • Authentication of PP against XRX^R throughout all rounds is affirmed iff Λ=trueΛ = \text{true}, succinctly represented as KΛΚ \Leftrightarrow Λ.

This refined algebraic framework for ΠΠ encapsulates the dynamic verification and authentication schema, highlighting from sequence preparation through verification results accumulation, culminating in the definitive authentication outcome.

To accurately reflect the comprehensive structure and the mathematical rigor of the multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony (ΠΠ), the description integrates our established axioms, lemmas, constraints, principles, and systemic implications:

Definition of System

  1. Initialization of the Protocol (ΠΠ): The protocol ΠΠ commences with an interactive, multi-round challenge-response proof ceremony, aiming to authenticate a sequence P={p1,p2,,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\} against a dynamically shuffled alphabet XRX^R, originating from a static set AA.

  2. Preparation of the Alphabet (AA) and Shuffled Alphabet (XRX^R): The static alphabet AA forms the base. Each round RR within ΠΠ employs the shuffling function ΣΣ to randomize AA, producing XRX^R, ensuring unique configurations per round to bolster unpredictability.

  3. Generation and Verification of the Sequence (PP): Constructed from indexed elements of AA, the sequence PP undergoes authentication. For each round RR, a target subset xiRXRx_i^R \subseteq X^R is identified for verifying pip_i, directed by the witness function Ω(pi)xiRΩ(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R.

  4. Witness and Random Distribution per Round (ΩΩ and ΣΣ): The authenticator, via ΩΩ, specifies the subset xiRx_i^R anticipated to enclose pip_i. The operation ΣΣ delineates the process for random distribution of AA into XRX^R, further partitioning it into subsets for each round RR, thereby ensuring procedural randomness and integrity.

  5. Membership Verification per Round (MΜ) and Result Accumulation (ΛΛ): Every round RR leverages the verification condition M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) to determine pip_i's presence in xiRx_i^R, as indicated by ΩΩ. The aggregation of these verification results is orchestrated by ΛΛ, requiring all verifications (MΜ) to affirmatively confirm pip_i's correct placement for the proof KΚ to be authenticated.

  6. Conclusion of the Protocol with Proof of Knowledge (KΚ): The protocol ΠΠ culminates in the establishment of proof KΚ, which attains validation solely if ΛΛ, representing the cumulative verification results, substantiates each pip_i of PP within the apt subset xiRx_i^R throughout all rounds RR. This validation process underscores the authenticator's exhaustive comprehension and precise allocation of PP within XRX^R, evidenced by uniform verifications.

  7. Security and Integrity of the Protocol: The foundational security and structural integrity of ΠΠ are safeguarded by the algorithmic shuffling of XRX^R (ΣΣ), the diligent execution of membership verification (MΜ) at each phase, and the comprehensive collection of verification outcomes (ΛΛ). This framework, emphasizing the variability of subsets xiRx_i^R and the imperative for unbroken verification across rounds, constructs a formidable safeguard against unauthorized access or manipulative breaches, ensuring the protocol's robustness and reliability.

Description of the The Rosario-Wang Proofs

Summary of the Direct Proof

The direct proof concerning the Rosario-Wang Proofs establishes that the accumulator ΛΛ precisely encapsulates the comprehensive authentication of a sequence PP across all verification rounds RR in the protocol ΠΠ. Given the foundational elements such as the static alphabet AA, sequence PP, shuffling function ΣΣ, indicating function ΩΩ, and verification condition MΜ, the proof methodically demonstrates how ΛΛ, through logical conjunction of all verification outcomes, signifies the universal authentication success of PP. It argues that if ΛΛ is true, then every element pip_i of PP has been successfully authenticated within its respective subset xiRx_i^R for all rounds, signifying the theorem's validity and ΠΠ's efficacy in secure and rigorous sequence authentication.

Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)

Stating that the accumulator ΛΛ is the result of performing a logical AND operation (\bigwedge) over all verification results M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) for each element pip_i within its specified subset xiRx_i^R across all rounds RR from 1 to nn.

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Summary of the Probabilistic Proof via Induction

The probabilistic proof via induction explores the increasing likelihood of the sequence PP's authentication across rounds within ΠΠ, underpinned by probabilistic conditions. Starting with an assumption for a high probability of successful verification in the base case R=1R=1, it extends this logic through mathematical induction to all rounds, asserting that ΛΛ's accuracy in reflecting PP's authentication approaches certainty as rounds increase. This proof leverages the inherent security and fairness of the verification process MΜ and shuffling function ΣΣ, suggesting that with each successive round, the probability that ΛΛ correctly signifies PP's comprehensive authentication nears absolute certainty, thus illustrating ΠΠ's dynamic and robust verification mechanism.

  1. Probability of success in round R=1R=1:

P(success in R=1)=pP(\text{success in } R=1) = p
  1. Cumulative probability from R=1R=1 to R=k+1R=k+1:

P(success up to R=k+1)=P(success up to R=k)P(success in R=k+1)P(\text{success up to } R=k+1) = P(\text{success up to } R=k) \cdot P(\text{success in } R=k+1)

Notably, since P(success in R=k+1)=pP(\text{success in } R=k+1) = p due to the independence of rounds, this can also be simplified to:

P(success up to R=k+1)=P(success up to R=k)pP(\text{success up to } R=k+1) = P(\text{success up to } R=k) \cdot p
  1. Probability that ΛΛ accurately reflects authentication of PP:

P(Λ=true)=limnR=1npP(Λ = \text{true}) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \prod_{R=1}^{n} p

Assuming each round's success is independent and identically distributed, this reflects the increasing certainty of authentication with an increasing number of rounds, given the initial probability of success pp is greater than 0.50.5. .

Summary of the Accumulation of Results Proof of ΛΛ

The Accumulation of Results Proof for ΛΛ rigorously illustrates how the accumulator ΛΛ, through its nuanced definition as the product of conditional probabilities of verification outcomes M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R), serves as a nuanced indicator of the sequence PP's authentication within the protocol ΠΠ. This proof methodologically explores how Λnew=R=1nPr(M(pi,xiR)=truexiR,R)Λ_{\text{new}} = \prod_{R=1}^{n} \Pr(Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} | x_i^R, R) encapsulates the comprehensive verification success across all rounds RR, introducing a probability-based perspective to the verification process. It asserts that if ΛnewΛ_{\text{new}} signifies high probability, it unequivocally demonstrates that each element pip_i in PP has been authenticated within its appropriate subset xiRx_i^R for every round, embodying the operational core and rigorous verification standards of ΠΠ. This proof emphasizes the principle that ΛnewΛ_{\text{new}}'s significance extends beyond mere reflection of successful individual verifications; it represents a holistic authentication of PP across the entire spectrum of ΠΠ's verification mechanism, underpinned by a probabilistic model that captures the varying degrees of verification confidence and integrity.

Λnew=R=1nPr(M(pi,xiR)=truexiR,R)Λ_{\text{new}} = \prod_{R=1}^{n} \Pr(Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} | x_i^R, R)

Summary of the Proof by Contradiction

The Proof by Contradiction within the Rosario-Wang Proofs framework leverages the logical underpinnings of contradiction to reinforce the theorem that ΛΛ accurately signifies the sequence PP's authentication across all rounds in ΠΠ. By initially supposing the theorem's negation—where ΛΛ could either falsely represent authentication success or fail to signify authentication despite complete verification—this proof navigates through potential logical inconsistencies that such assumptions would entail. It delves into two hypothetical scenarios: one where ΛΛ is true despite a failure in correct verification for at least one pip_i, and another where ΛΛ is false despite all pip_i being correctly verified. By demonstrating that both scenarios lead to contradictions with the established definitions and operational rules of ΠΠ, such as the nature of MΜ and the logical structure of ΛΛ, the proof conclusively affirms the original theorem. This approach not only validates the theorem through the elimination of contradictory premises but also highlights the coherence and logical integrity of ΠΠ's verification system, illustrating its robust framework for sequence authentication.

R{1,2,...,n},i:(Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR))(M(pi,xiR)=true)\forall R \in \{1, 2, ..., n\}, \forall i: \left( Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \right) \Leftrightarrow \left( Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} \right)

Indicating that ΛΛ, the accumulator of verification results, is true if and only if, for every round RR from 1 to nn and for every ii, the verification condition M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) holds true, signifying that each pip_i is correctly verified within its designated subset xiRx_i^R.

#1: Direct Proof


Given a multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony (ΠΠ), we construct a Direct Proof of the theorem stating that the effective accumulation of verification results (ΛΛ) accurately encapsulates the comprehensive authentication of sequence PP across all rounds RR, underlined by ΠΠ.

Theorem to Prove

If the conjunction Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) holds true, then the sequence P={p1,p2,,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\} is authenticated against the dynamically shuffled alphabet XRX^R across all rounds RR. This authentication ensures that the union of all shuffled alphabets XRX^R across every round RR equals XRX^R for each individual round, represented mathematically as RXR=R:XR\bigcup_{R} X^R = \forall R: X^R.

Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)
P={p1,p2,,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\}
RXR=trueorR:XR=true\bigcup_{R} X^R = \text{true} \quad \text{or} \quad \forall R: X^R = \text{true}

Given:

In the cryptographic protocol ΠΠ, AA represents a static set of symbols or an alphabet from which the sequence PP is constructed. The sequence P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\} is drawn from AA for the purpose of authentication. Through the shuffling function ΣΣ, AA is shuffled to generate a shuffled alphabet XRX^R for each round RR of the authentication process. The indicating function ΩΩ maps each element pip_i of PP to a specific subset xiRx_i^R within XRX^R, where xiRx_i^R is a subset of XRX^R, denoted as xiRXRx_i^R \subseteq X^R. The verification condition MΜ asserts the presence of pip_i within the subset xiRx_i^R, with M(pi,xiR)trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow \text{true} yielding true if the assertion holds. This comprehensive framework ensures the accurate verification of each element pip_i within its designated subset, contributing to the overall authentication process within the protocol ΠΠ.

AA: A static set of symbols or alphabet from which PP is constructed

P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\}

such that PP is drawn from AA to be authenticated.

Σ(A)XRΣ(A) \rightarrow X^R

shuffles AA to produce a shuffled alphabet XRX^R for each round RR.

Ω(pi)xiRΩ(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R

A function indicating the specific subset :

xiRXRx_i^R \subseteq X^R

where element pip_i should be verified.

M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)

the verification condition that asserts pip_i is present within the subset

xiRtruex_i^R \Rightarrow \text{true}

, yielding true if the assertion holds.

Steps:

  1. Shuffling and Subset Identification:

    • By the design of ΠΠ, for each round RR, ΣΣ shuffles AA to generate a unique XRX^R, ensuring no two rounds have identical configurations, which enhances the security against replay attacks and ensures unpredictability.

    • For each pip_i in PP, ΩΩ identifies a specific subset xiRx_i^R within XRX^R for verification, guided by the operational rules of ΠΠ.

  2. Verification Across Rounds:

    • The verification process M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) is applied to each pip_i within its designated subset xiRx_i^R for all rounds RR. By the assumption that ΛΛ is true, we understand M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} for all ii and RR, meaning every pip_i is verified to be correctly positioned within xiRx_i^R.

  3. Accumulation of Verification Results (ΛΛ):

    • ΛΛ, as defined, is the logical conjunction (\bigwedge) of all verification outcomes MΜ across rounds RR. The truth of ΛΛ implies a universal verification success, signifying that each element pip_i of PP has been authenticated within its respective subset xiRx_i^R across all rounds.

  4. Authentication of PP:

    • Since ΛΛ is true, and given that ΛΛ represents the accumulation of successful verifications (MΜ) of PP against XRX^R, it logically follows that PP has been fully authenticated across the entirety of ΠΠ's operational span.

Conclusion:

The truth of ΛΛ unequivocally indicates that the sequence PP has been authenticated against the shuffled alphabet XRX^R in all rounds RR, thereby confirming the theorem through direct proof. This demonstrates not only the integrity of ΠΠ's verification process but also its effectiveness in ensuring the authenticity of PP within a cryptographically secure and logically rigorous framework.

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#2: Probabilistic Proof via Induction


The probabilistic proof leveraging mathematical induction offers a compelling argument for the authentication of a sequence PP against a shuffled alphabet XRX^R within the cryptographic protocol ΠΠ. This approach intricately combines the principles of probability theory with mathematical induction to illustrate the increasing certainty of authentication as the protocol progresses through its rounds. Central to this proof is the assumption that with each round RR, the verification process MΜ applied to elements pip_i in PP against their designated subsets xiRx_i^R has a high likelihood of success, designated by a probability pp greater than 0.5. This foundation ensures that at the outset, even in the initial round R=1R=1, the protocol is predisposed towards successful authentication.

By inductively assuming the near-certainty of authentication up to any arbitrary round kk and extending this to round k+1k+1, the proof effectively demonstrates that the accumulator ΛnewΛ_{\text{new}}, which aggregates the verification results M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) across rounds, becomes an increasingly reliable indicator of PP's authentication. This logical progression from the base case through the inductive step underscores not just the efficacy of ΠΠ in verifying PP but also the role of ΛnewΛ_{\text{new}} as a metric of comprehensive authentication. The inductive approach highlights the strength of ΠΠ's verification mechanism, ensuring that with each additional round, the protocol reinforces the sequence PP's integrity against XRX^R, with ΛnewΛ_{\text{new}} serving as the definitive measure of this continuous authentication process.

Assertion to Prove

The probability that the accumulator ΛnewΛ_{\text{new}}, representing the aggregation of verification results M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R), accurately reflects the comprehensive authentication of sequence PP across all rounds RR, approaches certainty (i.e., probability 1) as the number of rounds nn increases, given a sufficiently secure and unbiased verification process.

Base Case (Round R=1R=1)

  • Assumption: The shuffling function ΣΣ generates X1X^1 from AA such that each pip_i has an equal and independent chance of being correctly positioned within its designated subset xi1x_i^1 for verification.

  • Probability: Let pp be the probability that M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} for a single round, with pp significantly greater than 0.50.5 (indicating a higher likelihood of success than failure for each verification).

  • Observation: For the base case of R=1R=1, if pp is high, the likelihood that ΛnewΛ_{\text{new}} correctly signifies the authentication of PP is also high.

Inductive Step (Assuming Truth for R=kR=k to Show for R=k+1R=k+1)

  • Inductive Hypothesis: Assume for R=kR=k rounds, the probability of ΛnewΛ_{\text{new}} accurately representing the authentication of PP is very close to 1, given the process's security and unbiased nature.

  • Next Round R=k+1R=k+1:

    • When ΣΣ shuffles AA to produce Xk+1X^{k+1}, and ΩΩ and MΜ operate as defined, the independent probability of successful verification for each pip_i remains pp.

    • The addition of round k+1k+1 maintains the probability of success for ΛnewΛ_{\text{new}} near 1, given the cumulative success from previous rounds and the independent, high probability pp of success in each round.

Conclusion from Inductive Step

  • By mathematical induction, if ΛnewΛ_{\text{new}} is likely to accurately reflect PP's authentication for R=1R=1 and assuming ΛnewΛ_{\text{new}}'s accuracy for R=kR=k leads to its accuracy for R=k+1R=k+1, then ΛnewΛ_{\text{new}} is highly likely to be true for all rounds RR, signaling comprehensive authentication of PP.


Probaility over Inductive Rounds

The probabilistic proof for the comprehensive authentication of a sequence PP against a dynamically shuffled alphabet XRX^R across all rounds (RR) in the protocol ΠΠ, we'll employ a strategy that incorporates principles of mathematical induction and probability theory. This approach aims to establish the high likelihood of PP's authentication when ΛΛ aggregates positive verification results across all rounds, under the assumption of certain probabilistic conditions.

Formalization of the Probablistic Proof

To formalize a probabilistic proof of the comprehensive authentication of a sequence PP across all rounds in the multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony (ΠΠ), let's define the necessary formulaic sequences and equations. This formulation will rely on establishing a probability model that demonstrates the efficacy of ΛΛ in representing the true authentication of PP as the number of rounds nn increases.

Given a sufficiently secure and unbiased verification process ensured by ΣΣ and MΜ, and the probabilistic advantage conferred by pp, the probabilistic proof via induction confirms that the likelihood of ΛΛ accurately representing the complete authentication of PP approaches certainty as the number of rounds increases. This methodological approach not only validates the robustness of ΠΠ's verification system but also affirms its capacity to adapt and respond to the dynamic challenges of sequence authentication in a cryptographic context. Through the application of this probabilistic induction proof, ΠΠ emerges as a sophisticated and reliable protocol for ensuring the security and authenticity of sequences within a probabilistically modeled framework.

Given Variables and Parameters

  • Let AA represent the static alphabet.

  • Let P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\} be the sequence to be authenticated.

  • Let XR=Σ(A)X^R = Σ(A) denote the shuffled alphabet for round RR, generated by the shuffling function ΣΣ.

  • Let Ω(pi)xiRΩ(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R denote the indicating function that specifies the subset within XRX^R for the verification of pip_i.

  • Let M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) be the binary verification function yielding true if pip_i is correctly verified within xiRx_i^R.

  • Let pp represent the probability that M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} for a given pip_i in round RR, with the assumption that p>0.5p > 0.5, indicating a favorable chance of successful verification.

Probabilistic Proof

Theoretical Base Case: R=1R=1

  • Probability of M(pi,xi1)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^1) = \text{true} for each pip_i: P(success in R=1)=pP(\text{success in } R=1) = p.

Inductive Step: From R=kR=k to R=k+1R=k+1

  • Inductive Hypothesis: Assume that the probability P(success up to R=k)P(\text{success up to } R=k) approaches 1 as kk increases, based on the cumulative success of verifying each pip_i in their respective xiRx_i^R with probability pp in each round.

  • For Round R=k+1R=k+1:

    • The probability of success for round k+1k+1, independent of previous rounds, remains pp.

    • The cumulative probability of success from R=1R=1 to R=k+1R=k+1 can be represented as:

P(success up to R=k+1)=P(success up to R=k)×P(success in R=k+1)P(\text{success up to } R=k+1) = P(\text{success up to } R=k) \times P(\text{success in } R=k+1)

Given P(success in R=k+1)=pP(\text{success in } R=k+1) = p, and assuming P(success up to R=k)P(\text{success up to } R=k) approaches 1, the product also approaches 1, implying high efficacy of ΛΛ in authenticating PP.

Accumulation of Verification Results (ΛΛ)

  • The formal representation of ΛΛ as the logical AND (\bigwedge) of all verification outcomes across nn rounds is modeled by the equation:

Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)
  • The probability that ΛΛ accurately reflects the authentication of PP is then modeled as:

P(Λ=true)=limnR=1npP(Λ = \text{true}) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \prod_{R=1}^{n} p

Conclusion

The formulaic sequence and equations provided model the probability that the accumulation of verification results (ΛΛ) effectively authenticates the sequence PP in ΠΠ. Under the assumption of a secure verification process and a fair shuffling mechanism, the model demonstrates that as the number of rounds nn increases, the likelihood of ΛΛ representing true authentication of PP approaches certainty. This probabilistic proof underscores the robustness of ΠΠ in ensuring the sequence PP's integrity across a dynamic verification framework.

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#3: Accumulation of Results Proof of (ΛΛ)


The accumulator ΛΛ in the cryptographic protocol ΠΠ plays a pivotal role in the authentication process of a sequence PP against a dynamically shuffled alphabet XRX^R through all rounds RR. This process is contingent upon the successful verification of each element pip_i within the designated subset xiRx_i^R. With AA as the foundational alphabet, the protocol intricately shuffles AA into XRX^R for each round using the shuffling function ΣΣ, thereby ensuring a unique configuration for each verification instance. This unique setup, alongside the indicating function ΩΩ that specifies the subset for verification, and the verification condition MΜ affirming the presence of pip_i in xiRx_i^R, establishes a robust framework for sequence authentication.

To establish the theorem that ΛΛ accurately reflects PP's authentication, two directions of logic are explored. The forward direction asserts that if ΛΛ is true, then all verification conditions M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) across rounds RR must be positive, signifying successful authentication of each pip_i within its respective subset xiRx_i^R. Conversely, the backward direction posits that the verification of each pip_i within the correct subset xiRx_i^R for all rounds necessarily leads to the truth of ΛΛ, thereby substantiating KΚ (KΛΚ \Leftrightarrow Λ) as the ultimate proof of knowledge. This logical framework underscores the necessity and sufficiency of ΛΛ for the comprehensive verification of PP, attesting to the protocol ΠΠ's efficacy in ensuring the integrity and authenticity of the sequence authentication process.

Theorem

In ΠΠ, the accumulator ΛΛ unequivocally reflects the sequence PP's authentication against the shuffled alphabet XRX^R across all rounds RR, contingent on the verification of every element pip_i within the appropriate subset xiRx_i^R.

Given:

Within the cryptographic protocol ΠΠ, a series of fundamental elements form the basis for sequence authentication:

  • AA, representing the alphabet, serves as the foundational source from which both the sequence PP and the shuffled alphabets XRX^R are derived. Each element of PP, denoted as pip_i, is drawn from this static set of symbols.

  • P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\} constitutes the sequence subject to verification within the protocol. It comprises indexed elements pip_i selected from the alphabet AA, ready for authentication.

  • Σ(A)XRΣ(A) \rightarrow X^R embodies the shuffling function employed in each round RR of the protocol. This function operates on the alphabet AA to generate a distinct shuffled alphabet XRX^R for every iteration, enhancing the security and randomness of the authentication process.

  • Ω(pi)xiRΩ(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R plays a pivotal role in pinpointing the specific subset xiRx_i^R within the shuffled alphabet XRX^R for the verification of each element pip_i during round RR. This function ensures that each element is directed to its designated subset for accurate verification.

  • M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) serves as the verification condition crucial for affirming the presence of pip_i within its designated subset xiRx_i^R during the authentication process. This condition yields true if pip_i is successfully verified within the specified subset, thereby contributing to the robustness and integrity of the authentication mechanism within the protocol ΠΠ.

P,XRAP, X^R \sim A
P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\}
Σ(A)=XRΣ(A) = X^R
Ω(pi)=xiRΩ(p_i) = x_i^R
M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}

To Prove:

The equation Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) holds true if and only if all pip_i align with their corresponding xiRx_i^R. In the forward direction (), the truth of ΛΛ indicates that all verification conditions M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) across all rounds RR are met, confirming the successful validation of each pip_i within xiRx_i^R. Conversely, in the backward direction (), if every pip_i is verified within its correct xiRx_i^R for all rounds RR, then all M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) must be true, thereby necessitating the truth of ΛΛ. This mutual implication validates KΚ as being equivalent to ΛΛ, ensuring the authenticity of the sequence authentication process within the protocol.

Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)

is true if and only if all pip_i align with their corresponding xiRx_i^R.

  • (⇒ Direction): Assuming ΛΛ is true signifies all verification conditions M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) across RR are affirmative, denoting each pip_i's successful validation within xiRx_i^R.

  • (⇐ Direction): Conversely, if each pip_i is verified within the correct xiRx_i^R for all RR, then all M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) are true, mandating ΛΛ's truth, thereby validating KΚ as KΛΚ \Leftrightarrow Λ.

Conclusion: Thus, ΛΛ's truthfulness is both a necessary and sufficient condition for PP's comprehensive verification against XRX^R, attesting to ΠΠ's effectiveness. .

#4: Proof by Contradiction


Theorem

In the protocol ΠΠ, the accumulator of verification results (ΛΛ) is true if and only if every element pip_i of the sequence PP is verified to be within the correct subset xiRx_i^R of XRX^R for each round RR.

Assumption for Contradiction:

Suppose our theorem statement is false. That is, there exist two possibilities under this assumption:

  1. ΛΛ is true even though there is at least one pip_i that is not verified to be within its correct subset xiRx_i^R for some round RR.

  2. ΛΛ is false even though every pip_i is verified to be within its correct subset xiRx_i^R for all rounds RR.

Exploration of Possibility 1:

  • Given ΛΛ is true, by definition, this means Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) must hold true for all pip_i and RR.

  • If there is at least one pip_i not in its correct subset xiRx_i^R yet ΛΛ is true, this would imply M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} for a situation where pixiRp_i \notin x_i^R, contradicting the definition of MΜ.

  • This contradiction demonstrates that the first possibility cannot occur if ΛΛ accurately reflects the verification process, as per the protocol’s logic.

Exploration of Possibility 2:

  • Assuming every pip_i is verified within its correct subset xiRx_i^R for all rounds RR, by definition of MΜ, this should result in

  • for all instances.

  • If ΛΛ were false under these conditions, it would imply that the aggregation of all true M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) results in ΛΛ being false, which is logically impossible given

Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)

is a conjunction of all verification conditions.

  • This logical impossibility confirms that the second possibility is not feasible, reinforcing the accuracy and integrity of ΛΛ in aggregating verification outcomes.

Conclusion:

Given the contradictions found in both possible scenarios under the assumption that our theorem statement is false, we conclude that the original statement must be true. Therefore, ΛΛ is true if and only if every pip_i in PP is verified to be within its correct subset xiRx_i^R across all rounds RR, thereby substantiating the comprehensive verification of PP within the dynamically secure framework of ΠΠ. This proof by contradiction not only affirms the logical structure of ΠΠ but also underscores its reliability and validity in sequence authentication.

#5: Extended Proofs ( Accumulation Efficacy)


In the mathematical framework of the multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony (ΠΠ), which operates on a sequence PP derived from a static alphabet AA, we define the processes and validations crucial to the protocol's operation. Initially, during the initialization and shuffling phase, given P={p1,p2,,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\} and AA as inputs, the shuffling function ΣΣ transforms AA into uniquely shuffled sets XRX^R for each verification round RR. This process enhances security by introducing unpredictability. Subsequently, the witness function ΩΩ assigns each pip_i to a specific subset xiRx_i^R within XRX^R for verification. The verification condition MΜ then ensures that pip_i is indeed present within xiRx_i^R, denoted by M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} if pip_i belongs to xiRx_i^R. This step authenticates each element against its designated subset, ensuring the integrity of the verification process.

Moving on to the accumulation of verification results, the outcomes of MΜ across all rounds are aggregated into ΛΛ, represented as Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)\Lambda = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R). This accumulation encapsulates the collective verification success. Finally, the validity of the proof, denoted by KΚ, is established based on the collective truth of ΛΛ, expressed as KΛΚ \Leftrightarrow Λ. In essence, ΛΛ serves as a measure of cumulative verification success, and KΚ's validity hinges upon unanimous positive verifications, thereby affirming the authenticity of PP within the dynamic context of ΠΠ.

In the context of the multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony (ΠΠ), operating over a sequence PP derived from a static alphabet AA, we formalize the operations, verification, and the final synthesis of proof through a detailed mathematical exposition, ensuring clarity and alignment with foundational principles.

Protocol Operation and Verification Rounds

  1. Initialization and Shuffling:

    • Given: P={p1,p2,,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\} and AA as inputs.

    • Operation: For each verification round RR, apply ΣΣ to AA to yield XRX^R.

XR=Σ(A),R{1,2,,n}X^R = Σ(A), \quad \forall R \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}

Meaning: ΣΣ denotes the shuffling function, transforming AA into a uniquely shuffled set XRX^R for each round, enhancing unpredictability and security.

2. Witness Function and Verification: - Process: ΩΩ determines a target subset xiRXRx_i^R \subseteq X^R for each pip_i.

Ω(pi)xiR,i{1,2,,n}Ω(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R, \quad \forall i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}

Verification: Assess pip_i's presence within xiRx_i^R, denoted by MΜ.

M(pi,xiR)=true    pixiRΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} \iff p_i \in x_i^R

Implication: This step authenticates each pip_i against its assigned subset, validating authenticity per round.

Accumulation of Verification Results

  1. Results Accumulation and Proof Validation:

    • Accumulation: Compile outcomes of MΜ across all rounds into ΛΛ.

Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)\Lambda = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)

Final Proof: Validate KΚ based on the collective truth of ΛΛ.

KΛΚ \Leftrightarrow Λ

Interpretation: ΛΛ embodies the cumulative verification success, with KΚ's validity contingent upon unanimous positive verifications, affirming PP's authentication within the dynamic context of ΠΠ.

Theorem: The effective aggregation of verification results (ΛΛ) precisely reflects the comprehensive authentication of sequence PP across all rounds (RR), encapsulated by ΠΠ.

Forward Assertion: If ΛΛ is true, implying the aggregate of MΜ over RR is uniformly positive, then each pip_i is verified within the correct xiRx_i^R, thus:

Λ=true    piP,M(pi,xiR)=true,RΛ = \text{true} \implies \forall p_i \in P, \, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}, \, \forall R

Backward Assertion: Conversely, if each pip_i is successfully authenticated within its designated subset xiRx_i^R for all RR, then ΛΛ must be true, encapsulating the protocol’s integrity:

R=1nM(pi,xiR)=true,i    Λ=true\bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}, \forall i \implies Λ = \text{true}

Conclusion: This delineation affirms that ΛΛ, as an accumulation of MΜ across rounds, serves as a robust metric for the authentication of PP, with KΚ as the conclusive proof of knowledge, underscoring ΠΠ's efficacy in sequence verification within a dynamically secure framework.

To ensure alignment with our established lemmas, axioms, constraints, and systemic framework, we refine the proof of accumulation efficacy to mirror the intricacies and specifications of our system ΠΠ. This revised proof elucidates the critical role of ΛΛ in confirming the authentication of the sequence PP throughout all verification rounds RR, in accordance with the operational principles and verification logic of ΠΠ.

Extended Proof of Accumulation Efficacy

Theorem: The accumulator ΛΛ, through the effective aggregation of verification results, accurately represents the thorough authentication of the sequence PP across every round RR within the protocol ΠΠ.

Refined Assertions

Forward Assertion: Assuming ΛΛ holds true, indicating a universal affirmation of the verification condition MΜ across all rounds RR, it logically follows that every element pip_i of PP has been validated within its respective subset xiRx_i^R. This assertion can be formally captured as:

Λ=true    piP,R,M(pi,xiR)=trueΛ = \text{true} \implies \forall p_i \in P, \, \forall R, \, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}

This implies that the integrity of ΛΛ as true necessitates the successful verification of every pip_i within its designated xiRx_i^R across all rounds, ensuring the completeness and correctness of the sequence PP authentication.

Backward Assertion: If, for each round RR, every pip_i is affirmatively verified within its intended subset xiRx_i^R, thereby fulfilling the verification condition MΜ, then the cumulative verification result ΛΛ must inherently be true. This logical proposition can be succinctly expressed as:

i,R,M(pi,xiR)=true    Λ=true\forall i, \, \forall R, \, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} \implies Λ = \text{true}

The sufficiency condition mandates that the aggregate verification success of all pip_i in their corresponding xiRx_i^R for every RR compels the truth of ΛΛ, encapsulating the protocol’s verification integrity and the sequential authentication's authenticity.

Conclusion

By analytically delineating both the forward and backward assertions, we solidify the theorem's validity, demonstrating that the truth value of ΛΛ—as the logical conjunction of all individual verification outcomes M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)—is both necessary and sufficient for affirming the comprehensive authentication of PP within the dynamic verification framework of ΠΠ. This refined proof underscores ΠΠ's robust verification mechanism, ensuring PP's integrity and validating KΚ as the definitive proof of knowledge. Through this elaboration, ΠΠ’s efficacy in securely authenticating sequences within a dynamically secure and algorithmically precise environment is irrefutably established, adhering to the rigorous standards set forth by our system's lemmas, axioms, and constraints.


Axioms and Lemmas

Axioms

Axiom of Initialization: The protocol ΠΠ commences with a predefined sequence PP, comprised of elements p1p_1 to pnp_n, and a static alphabet AA. For each verification round RR, the shuffling function ΣΣ generates a fresh and unpredictable shuffled version of AA, denoted as XRX^R. This axiom ensures that the protocol begins with a consistent sequence and introduces variability through shuffled alphabets in each round.

  • Equation: P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\}, XR=Σ(A)X^R = Σ(A) for R=1,2,...,nR = 1, 2, ..., n.

  • Expression: This axiom establishes the protocol ΠΠ begins with a predefined sequence PP, consisting of elements p1p_1 to pnp_n, and a static alphabet AA. For each verification round RR, a shuffled version of AA, denoted as XRX^R, is produced through the shuffling function ΣΣ, ensuring fresh and unpredictable challenges in each round.

Axiom of Random Distribution: Each round RR of the protocol ΠΠ produces a distinct shuffled alphabet XRX^R from the static alphabet AA via the shuffling function ΣΣ. The axiom asserts that for differing rounds RR and RR', the shuffled alphabets XRX^R and XRX^{R'} are distinct (XRXRX^R \neq X^{R'}). This condition ensures the unpredictability and non-repetitive nature of the challenges encountered in successive rounds, vital for enhancing the security of the verification process.

  • Equation: XR=Σ(A)X^R = Σ(A), ensuring XRXRX^R \neq X^{R'} for RRR \neq R'.

  • Expression: This asserts that each round RR of the protocol generates a uniquely shuffled alphabet XRX^R from AA, via ΣΣ. The condition XRXRX^R \neq X^{R'} for differing rounds ensures that the sequence of challenges is non-repetitive and unpredictable, fundamental for securing the verification process.

Axiom of Sequence Verification: For every element pip_i within the sequence PP, there exists a designated subset xiRx_i^R within the shuffled alphabet XRX^R where pip_i can be located and verified. This axiom emphasizes the protocol's capability to identify and authenticate individual elements of the sequence, ensuring the integrity of the verification process.

  • Equation: Existence of xiRx_i^R such that pixiRp_i \in x_i^R for each pip_i in PP.

  • Expression: For every element pip_i within the sequence PP, there exists a targeted subset xiRx_i^R within the shuffled alphabet XRX^R where pip_i can be found and verified. This axiom underscores the protocol's capacity to pinpoint and verify individual sequence elements.

Axiom of Completeness: The axiom asserts that for all elements pip_i within the sequence PP, there exists at least one subset xiRx_i^R within the shuffled alphabet XRX^R where the verification condition MΜ returns true (M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}). This ensures comprehensive verification of every element of PP throughout the execution of the protocol, reinforcing its reliability and completeness.

  • Equation: piP,xiRXR:M(pi,xiR)=true\forall p_i \in P, \exists x_i^R \in X^R : Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}.

  • Expression: Signifies that for all elements pip_i within PP, there must be a subset xiRx_i^R in XRX^R for which the verification condition MΜ returns true, ensuring every element of PP is verified throughout the protocol's execution.

Axiom of Non-collision: This axiom guarantees the uniqueness of the generated shuffled alphabets XRX^R and their corresponding subsets xiRx_i^R across different rounds. It ensures that no collisions occur in the generation process, maintaining the integrity of the verification process by preventing identical shuffles or subsets from appearing in multiple rounds.

  • Equation: Unique generation of XRX^R and xiRx_i^R, preventing collisions.

  • Expression: Guarantees that the generation process for XRX^R and its subsets xiRx_i^R produces unique configurations, ensuring the integrity of the verification process by avoiding identical shuffles or subsets across different rounds.

Lemmas

Lemma of Witness Validity: This lemma asserts that if the witness function ΩΩ correctly identifies the subset xiRx_i^R for an element pip_i and the subsequent verification MΜ confirms the presence of pip_i within xiRx_i^R, then the verification of pip_i for that specific round is considered valid. Mathematically, it can be expressed as Ω(pi)xiRM(pi,xiR)=trueΩ(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R \land Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}, indicating the conjunction of ΩΩ and MΜ as criteria for valid verification.

  • Equation: Ω(pi)xiRM(pi,xiR)=trueΩ(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R \land Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}.

  • Expression: States that if the witness function ΩΩ accurately identifies the subset xiRx_i^R for an element pip_i, and the verification MΜ confirms pip_i's presence in xiRx_i^R, then pip_i's verification for that round is deemed valid.

Lemma of Comprehensive Verification: This lemma signifies that the sequence PP achieves full authentication against the shuffled alphabet XRX^R if, for each round RR, the verification condition MΜ holds true for every pip_i within its designated subset xiRx_i^R. Mathematically, it is represented as R=1nM(pi,xiR)P authenticated\bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow P \text{ authenticated}, emphasizing the comprehensive nature of the verification process across all rounds.

  • Equation: R=1nM(pi,xiR)P authenticated\bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow P \text{ authenticated}.

  • Expression: Indicates that the sequence PP is fully authenticated against the shuffled alphabet XRX^R if, for all rounds RR, the verification condition MΜ for each pip_i within its respective subset xiRx_i^R holds true.

Lemma of Accumulative Proof: In this lemma, the final proof of knowledge KΚ is validated if the accumulator ΛΛ, which aggregates all verification outcomes MΜ across rounds RR, evaluates to true. This lemma encapsulates the protocol's integrity by affirming the authentication of the sequence PP through cumulative verification success. Mathematically, it is denoted as Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)K=trueΛ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow Κ = \text{true}.

  • Equation: Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)K=trueΛ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow Κ = \text{true}.

  • Expression: Explains that the final proof of knowledge KΚ is validated if the accumulator ΛΛ, which aggregates all verification outcomes MΜ across rounds RR, is true. This encapsulates the protocol's integrity by affirming the sequence PP's authentication through cumulative verification success.

Lemma of Dynamic Adaptability: Asserting the protocol's ability to adapt to varying sizes of the sequence PP and alphabet AA without compromising integrity, this lemma highlights the scalability and adaptability of ΠΠ. Mathematically, it states the adaptation without loss of ΠΠ integrity, expressed as P|P| and A|A| varying without affecting the protocol's integrity.

  • Equation: Adaptation to varying P|P| and A|A| without loss of ΠΠ integrity.

  • Expression: Asserts that the protocol ΠΠ can flexibly adjust to different sizes of the sequence PP and alphabet AA without compromising its verification integrity or security, demonstrating ΠΠ's scalability and adaptability.

Lemma of Security Enhancement: This lemma emphasizes the protocol's enhanced security against cryptographic and brute-force threats due to the unpredictability introduced by the shuffling function ΣΣ, creating a dynamic and secure verification environment. Mathematically, it states the security enhancement as Σ(A)XRΣ(A) \rightarrow X^R, underlining the crucial role of ΣΣ in bolstering security measures within the protocol.

  • Equation: Enhanced security through unpredictability, Σ(A)XRΣ(A) \rightarrow X^R.

  • Expression: Highlights that security against cryptographic and brute-force threats is significantly enhanced by the unpredictability factor introduced through the shuffling function ΣΣ, creating a dynamic and secure verification environment.

Constraints

Constraint of Round Completeness:

  • Equation: R,M(pi,xiR) must complete\forall R, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \text{ must complete}.

  • Expression: This constraint mandates that in every round RR, the verification process MΜ for each element pip_i within its designated subset xiRx_i^R must be fully executed, ensuring no part of the verification cycle is left incomplete.

Constraint of Subset Uniqueness:

  • Equation: xiRxjRx_i^R \neq x_j^{R'} for RRR \neq R' or iji \neq j.

  • Expression: To maintain the integrity of the verification process, each subset xiRx_i^R generated for a round RR must be unique. This prevents any potential overlap or repetition of subsets across different rounds, reinforcing the security and robustness of ΠΠ.

Constraint of Proof Consistency:

  • Equation: Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)K=trueΛ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow Κ = \text{true}.

  • Expression: The validation of the proof of knowledge KΚ hinges on the consistent truth of all verification outcomes MΜ aggregated in ΛΛ. This ensures that KΚ is declared true only if every element pip_i of PP is successfully verified across all rounds RR.

Constraint of Witness Integrity:

  • Equation: Ω(pi) must be verifiable against PΩ(p_i) \text{ must be verifiable against } P.

  • Expression: The witness ΩΩ, indicating where an element pip_i should be found within XRX^R, must be reliably linked to the prover's knowledge of the sequence PP. This guards against misleading or incorrect indications that could compromise the verification integrity.

Constraint of Verification Transparency:

  • Equation: M(pi,xiR)K must be externally verifiableΜ(p_i, x_i^R) \land Κ \text{ must be externally verifiable}.

  • Expression: The process underscores the necessity for both the verification outcomes MΜ and the final proof KΚ to be transparent and amenable to external verification. This openness fosters trust and verifiability in the authentication process implemented by ΠΠ.

Principles

  • Principle of Sequential Integrity:

    • Equation: Orderly M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) preserves PP integrity.

    • Expression: The orderly execution of verification MΜ for elements within PP, following the sequence integrity, ensures the robustness of the authentication process, guaranteeing that each step follows logically from the previous one without breaches in logical continuity.

  • Principle of Protocol Security:

    • Equation: Σ(A)R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λsecure ΠΣ(A) \land \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \land Λ \Rightarrow \text{secure } Π.

    • Expression: The security of the protocol ΠΠ is reinforced through the combination of unpredictable shuffling (ΣΣ), thorough verification (MΜ) across all rounds, and the cumulative confirmation (ΛΛ) of these verifications, creating a robust defense against unauthorized access and manipulation.

  • Principle of Verifiability:

    • Equation: External verification of MKΜ \land Κ.

    • Expression: Emphasizes the protocol's capacity for its verification steps and the final proof to be validated by third parties, enhancing the overall credibility and trustworthiness of ΠΠ.

  • Principle of Non-repudiation:

    • Equation: ΛΛ documents verification, preventing denial.

    • Expression: The documentation and aggregation of verification results in ΛΛ serve as a solid foundation for non-repudiation, ensuring that once an authentication claim is made, it cannot be denied or disputed.

Implications

  • Implication of Continuity:

    • Equation: ΠΠ mechanism for re-verification or secure termination after failure.

    • Expression: This ensures that ΠΠ includes mechanisms to either allow for the re-verification of elements upon failure or to securely terminate the session, safeguarding the integrity of the process and preventing potential security breaches.

  • Implication of Evolution:

    • Equation: ΠΠ updates to cryptographic methods without negating past validations.

    • Expression: ΠΠ is designed to be future-proof, permitting updates and enhancements to its cryptographic methodologies without invalidating previously authenticated sequences. This adaptability ensures that ΠΠ remains relevant and secure in the face of evolving cryptographic landscapes.


Rosario-Wang Protocol

Initialization of the Protocol (Π)

  1. Protocol Initialization:

    • Let ΠΠ denote the entire proof of knowledge protocol.

    • AA represents the static alphabet from which sequences are generated.

    • P={p1,p2,,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\} is the sequence to be authenticated, with pip_i being the ii-th element of PP.

Preparation of the Alphabet and Shuffled Alphabet

  1. Alphabet Preparation and Shuffling:

    • XRX^R represents the shuffled alphabet derived from AA for round RR, where R=1,2,,nR = 1, 2, \ldots, n.

    • The shuffling process per round is defined by Σ(A)XRΣ(A) \rightarrow X^R, ensuring each XRX^R is a unique permutation of AA.

Generation of the Sequence and its Verification

  1. Sequence Generation and Subset Selection:

    • For each round RR, a subset xiRXRx_i^R \subseteq X^R is targeted for verification. Here, ii corresponds to the targeted index within PP for that round.

    • The selection of xiRx_i^R for a given piPp_i \in P is guided by a witness ΩΩ, which indicates the appropriate subset xiRx_i^R where pip_i should be found.

Verification Process

  1. Verification and Witness:

    • The verification condition for round RR is denoted as M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R), checking if pip_i is present within xiRx_i^R.

    • The witness Ω(pi)xiRΩ(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R links pip_i to its corresponding subset xiRx_i^R for verification.

Result Accumulation and Proof of Knowledge

  1. Result Accumulation and Conclusion:

    • The accumulation of verification results across all rounds RR is captured by Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R), where ΛΛ is true iff all instances of MΜ are true.

    • The final proof of knowledge, KΚ, is validated iff ΛΛ is true, denoted mathematically as KΛΚ \Leftrightarrow Λ.

Notational Summary

  • ΠΠ: The multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony.

  • AA: The static alphabet.

  • PP: The sequence to be authenticated.

  • XRX^R: The shuffled alphabet for round RR.

  • xiRx_i^R: The subset of XRX^R targeted in round RR.

  • ΣΣ: The random distribution function that generates XRX^R from AA.

  • ΩΩ: The witness function that indicates the subset xiRx_i^R for verification of pip_i.

  • MΜ: The verification condition for a member pip_i in subset xiRx_i^R.

  • ΛΛ: The accumulator of verification results across rounds.

  • KΚ: The final proof of knowledge, affirming the authenticity of PP.


  1. Protocol and Sequence Declaration:

    • ΠΠ: Proof of knowledge protocol.

    • P={p1,p2,,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\}: Sequence to be authenticated.

  2. Alphabet and Shuffling:

    • AA: Static alphabet.

    • XR=Σ(A)X^R = Σ(A): Shuffled alphabet XX for round RR, obtained by applying the shuffling function ΣΣ to AA.

  3. Subset Selection and Verification:

    • xiRx_i^R: Subset of XRX^R targeted in round RR for verifying element pip_i.

    • Ω(pi)xiRΩ(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R: Witness function indicating the subset xiRx_i^R where pip_i is expected to be found for verification.

  4. Verification Condition:

    • M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R): Verification condition for round RR, checking if pip_i is present within xiRx_i^R.

  5. Result Accumulation and Proof of Knowledge:

    • Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R): Accumulator of verification results across all rounds RR, where ΛΛ is true if and only if all instances of MΜ are true.

    • KΛΚ \Leftrightarrow Λ: The final proof of knowledge KΚ is validated if and only if ΛΛ is true.

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