Eni6ma - Rosario-Wang Proof Cypher
Eni6ma - Rosario-Wang Proof Cypher
  • The Eni6ma Cypher (Rosario-Wang Proof)
    • Our MoonShot
    • Passwords are Broken
    • Overview of Rosario-Wang Proof
    • BigTech's MFA Exploitation
    • Eni6ma vs. MFA/FIDO
    • Navigating the Convergence
    • Password Brute Force
    • Beyond Computable Tractability
  • The Patent & Innovation
    • The Team
    • The Rosario-Wang Primitive
    • The Rosario-Wang Proof
    • White Paper : Accumulation of Memberships
    • Attack Vector Are Obsolete
    • Verification Protocol
  • Theoretical
    • Quantum Manifolds
    • The Cybernetics (Human/Machine) challenge.
    • Cybernetic Cryptography
    • Cryptographic Primitives
    • On Proof Systems
    • Fundamental of Security
    • Cryptographic Security Patterns
    • GΓΆdel's Incompleteness Of ZKPs
    • SuperIntelligence : Asimov Engine
      • Ai Box Problem explained
      • The Rosario Solution to the Ai Box Problem
    • Sovereign Private Portable Data
  • TECHNICAL SPECS
    • AI Safety & Alignment
    • ZERO-TRUST PROTOCOL
    • END TO END
    • COMPONENTS
      • COMMITMENT
      • PRIVATE KEY
      • PUBLIC KEY
      • SECRET MNEMONIC
      • VERIFIER
    • INTEGRATIONS
  • National Security
    • Security & Freedom
    • National Security: Part 1
    • National Security: Part 2
    • National Security: Part 3
    • Secure Ai Framework
    • πŸ€–(IFF) Ai Defense Protocol
  • EXAMPLE/DEMO
    • Use Cases
    • Examples
      • VIDEO
      • PORTABLE
      • NETWORKED
      • EMBEDDED
  • REFERENCES
    • REFERENCES
    • GLOSSARY
Powered by GitBook
On this page
  • Description of Ξ 
  • Operations and Verification Logic:
  • Definition of System
  • Description of the The Rosario-Wang Proofs
  • #1: Direct Proof
  • #2: Probabilistic Proof via Induction
  • Formalization of the Probablistic Proof
  • #3: Accumulation of Results Proof of ()
  • Theorem
  • #4: Proof by Contradiction
  • Theorem
  • #5: Extended Proofs ( Accumulation Efficacy)
  • Extended Proof of Accumulation Efficacy
  • Axioms and Lemmas
  • Axioms
  • Lemmas
  • Constraints
  • Principles
  • Implications
  • Rosario-Wang Protocol
  • Initialization of the Protocol (Ξ )
  • Preparation of the Alphabet and Shuffled Alphabet
  • Generation of the Sequence and its Verification
  • Verification Process
  • Result Accumulation and Proof of Knowledge
  • Notational Summary
  1. The Patent & Innovation

The Rosario-Wang Proof

Eni6ma Technology and the Rosario-Wang Proof/Cypher is Patent Pending. USPTO 2024. Copyright 2024 All right reserved. Eni6ma.org - Dylan Rosario


The Rosario-Wang Proofs, are a comprehensive suite of mathematical proofs across various methodologies including [1] Direct, Probabilistic via Induction, Accumulation of results, and proof by Contradiction, which collectively underscore the multifaceted rigor and robustness embedded in the cryptographic protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ . At the core of these proofs lies the objective of Ξ Ξ Ξ  to authenticate a sequence PPP through a meticulous process of verification against a dynamically shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR across numerous rounds. The direct proof initiates this exploration by asserting the fundamental logic and operational structure of Ξ Ξ Ξ , demonstrating how the accumulator ΛΛΛ signifies the complete authentication of PPP when every element pip_ipi​ is verified within its assigned subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for all rounds. This proof not only highlights Ξ Ξ Ξ 's thorough authentication process but also its capacity to safeguard the integrity and authenticity of PPP.

Building on this foundation, the probabilistic proof via induction introduces a layer of complexity by weaving in the principles of probability and mathematical induction. It posits that with each subsequent round, the likelihood of ΛΛΛ accurately representing the authentication of PPP markedly increases, presupposing a verification process characterized by security and impartiality. This aspect of the Rosario-Wang Proofs illustrates the dynamic and adaptable nature of Ξ Ξ Ξ 's verification mechanism, emphasizing its capability to consistently authenticate sequences amidst a landscape marked by variability and uncertainty.

The accumulation of results proof further solidifies the authentication framework of Ξ Ξ Ξ  by meticulously analyzing how ΛΛΛ, through the logical aggregation (β‹€\bigwedgeβ‹€) of all verification outcomes M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​), serves as an unequivocal metric of PPP's authentication across all rounds. This proof methodically navigates through Ξ Ξ Ξ 's verification process, affirming that the truth of ΛΛΛ is a comprehensive reflection of successful individual verifications and, by extension, the holistic authentication of PPP within Ξ Ξ Ξ 's verification spectrum.

Complementing these proofs, the proof by contradiction employs a logical exploration of potential contradictions to reinforce the theorem that ΛΛΛ truthfully signifies PPP's authentication. By examining hypothetical scenarios where ΛΛΛ could misrepresent the authentication status of PPP, this proof navigates through logical inconsistencies to affirm the original theorem's validity, thereby highlighting the coherence and structural integrity of Ξ Ξ Ξ 's verification system.

Together, these proofs constitute a detailed validation framework for Ξ Ξ Ξ , offering a nuanced perspective on its approach to sequence authentication. From establishing the foundational logic and operational integrity to exploring probabilistic certainties and addressing potential logical contradictions, the Rosario-Wang Proofs not only substantiate Ξ Ξ Ξ 's theoretical and practical reliability but also underscore its innovative contributions to the realm of cryptographic authentication. Through this comprehensive proof suite, Ξ Ξ Ξ  is demonstrated to authenticate sequences with a high degree of certainty, security, and adaptability, reflecting its significance within the cryptographic landscape.

The disclosed proofs within this chapter offer a detailed validation framework utilizing the following methods :

Shuffling Function (Ξ£\SigmaΞ£): By mapping a static alphabet AAA onto a shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR for each round RRR, ensuring each verification round has a unique configuration.

Σ:A→XR\quad \Sigma: A \rightarrow X^RΣ:A→XR

Subset Indication (Ξ©\OmegaΞ©): For every element pip_ipi​ in the sequence PPP, a specific subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ within XRX^RXR is identified for verification purposes, establishing the basis for each element's validation.

M(pi)=xiR\quad M(p_i) = x_i^RM(pi​)=xiR​

Element Verification (MMM): The verification function MMM assesses whether each element pip_ipi​ is correctly located within its designated subset xiRx_i^RxiR​, with verification success explicitly contingent upon the element's presence within the subset.

M(pi,xiR)=trueβ€…β€ŠβŸΊβ€…β€Špi∈xiR\quad M(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} \iff p_i \in x_i^RM(pi​,xiR​)=true⟺piβ€‹βˆˆxiR​

Result Accumulation (Ξ›\LambdaΞ›): Aggregates the outcomes of all verification efforts across rounds through logical conjunction, encapsulating the collective success of element verifications.

Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)\quad \Lambda = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} M(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=R=1β‹€n​M(pi​,xiR​)

Probabilistic Result Accumulation (Ξ›new\Lambda_{\text{new}}Ξ›new​): Enhances the accumulation process by considering the probability of each verification's success, factoring in the conditions and round-specific contexts, thereby offering a nuanced view of the verification integrity.

Ξ›new=∏R=1nPr⁑(M(pi,xiR)=true∣xiR,R)\quad \Lambda_{\text{new}} = \prod_{R=1}^{n} \Pr(M(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} | x_i^R, R)Ξ›new​=R=1∏n​Pr(M(pi​,xiR​)=true∣xiR​,R)

Authentication Conclusion (K⇔ΛK \Leftrightarrow \LambdaK⇔Λ): Establishes the final authentication status of PPP, equating the proof of knowledge (KKK) directly with the truth of the accumulated verification results (Ξ›\LambdaΞ›), thereby affirming the sequence's authentication when the verification process consistently succeeds across all rounds.

K⇔Λ\quad K \Leftrightarrow \LambdaK⇔Λ

The given equations form a comprehensive mathematical framework for a cryptographic protocol, detailing the process from initial setup through to the final verification outcome:. Together, these equations systematically articulate the protocol's methodology for authenticating a sequence PPP against a dynamically shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR, incorporating both deterministic and probabilistic elements to ensure rigorous and comprehensive sequence authentication.

Description of Ξ 

Given:

  • A static alphabet AAA,

  • A sequence P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,...,pn​} designated for authentication,

  • A per-round uniquely shuffled alphabet XR=Ξ£(A)X^R = Ξ£(A)XR=Ξ£(A), and

  • A verification procedure for elements pi∈Pp_i \in Ppiβ€‹βˆˆP against subsets xiRβŠ†XRx_i^R \subseteq X^RxiRβ€‹βŠ†XR.

Operations and Verification Logic:

  1. Shuffling:

    • For each verification round RRR, AAA undergoes transformation into a shuffled variant XRX^RXR via ΣΣΣ, where Ξ£:Aβ†’XRΞ£: A \rightarrow X^RΞ£:Aβ†’XR, imbuing each round with distinctiveness.

  2. Subset Indication:

    • The indicating function ΩΩΩ, for each pip_ipi​, delineates the subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ within XRX^RXR designated for pip_ipi​'s verification, forming the verification challenge foundation for round RRR. Thus, Ξ©(pi)=xiRΞ©(p_i) = x_i^RΞ©(pi​)=xiR​.

  3. Element Verification:

    • Verification of pip_ipi​'s inclusion within xiRx_i^RxiR​ is executed via MΜM, where M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}M(pi​,xiR​)=true iff pip_ipi​ is ascertained within xiRx_i^RxiR​.

  4. Result Accumulation:

    • Cumulative verification over all rounds RRR is consolidated by ΛΛΛ, the logical conjunction of all verification results: Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​).

  5. Authentication Outcome:

    • Authentication of PPP against XRX^RXR throughout all rounds is affirmed iff Ξ›=trueΞ› = \text{true}Ξ›=true, succinctly represented as Kβ‡”Ξ›Ξš \Leftrightarrow Ξ›K⇔Λ.

This refined algebraic framework for Ξ Ξ Ξ  encapsulates the dynamic verification and authentication schema, highlighting from sequence preparation through verification results accumulation, culminating in the definitive authentication outcome.

To accurately reflect the comprehensive structure and the mathematical rigor of the multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony (Ξ Ξ Ξ ), the description integrates our established axioms, lemmas, constraints, principles, and systemic implications:

Definition of System

  1. Initialization of the Protocol (Ξ Ξ Ξ ): The protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ  commences with an interactive, multi-round challenge-response proof ceremony, aiming to authenticate a sequence P={p1,p2,…,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,…,pn​} against a dynamically shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR, originating from a static set AAA.

  2. Preparation of the Alphabet (AAA) and Shuffled Alphabet (XRX^RXR): The static alphabet AAA forms the base. Each round RRR within ΠΠΠ employs the shuffling function ΣΣΣ to randomize AAA, producing XRX^RXR, ensuring unique configurations per round to bolster unpredictability.

  3. Generation and Verification of the Sequence (PPP): Constructed from indexed elements of AAA, the sequence PPP undergoes authentication. For each round RRR, a target subset xiRβŠ†XRx_i^R \subseteq X^RxiRβ€‹βŠ†XR is identified for verifying pip_ipi​, directed by the witness function Ξ©(pi)β†’xiRΞ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^RΞ©(pi​)β†’xiR​.

  4. Witness and Random Distribution per Round (ΩΩΩ and ΣΣΣ): The authenticator, via ΩΩΩ, specifies the subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ anticipated to enclose pip_ipi​. The operation ΣΣΣ delineates the process for random distribution of AAA into XRX^RXR, further partitioning it into subsets for each round RRR, thereby ensuring procedural randomness and integrity.

  5. Membership Verification per Round (MΜM) and Result Accumulation (ΛΛΛ): Every round RRR leverages the verification condition M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) to determine pip_ipi​'s presence in xiRx_i^RxiR​, as indicated by ΩΩΩ. The aggregation of these verification results is orchestrated by ΛΛΛ, requiring all verifications (MΜM) to affirmatively confirm pip_ipi​'s correct placement for the proof KΚK to be authenticated.

  6. Conclusion of the Protocol with Proof of Knowledge (KΚK): The protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ  culminates in the establishment of proof KΚK, which attains validation solely if ΛΛΛ, representing the cumulative verification results, substantiates each pip_ipi​ of PPP within the apt subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ throughout all rounds RRR. This validation process underscores the authenticator's exhaustive comprehension and precise allocation of PPP within XRX^RXR, evidenced by uniform verifications.

  7. Security and Integrity of the Protocol: The foundational security and structural integrity of Ξ Ξ Ξ  are safeguarded by the algorithmic shuffling of XRX^RXR (ΣΣΣ), the diligent execution of membership verification (MΜM) at each phase, and the comprehensive collection of verification outcomes (ΛΛΛ). This framework, emphasizing the variability of subsets xiRx_i^RxiR​ and the imperative for unbroken verification across rounds, constructs a formidable safeguard against unauthorized access or manipulative breaches, ensuring the protocol's robustness and reliability.

Description of the The Rosario-Wang Proofs

Summary of the Direct Proof

The direct proof concerning the Rosario-Wang Proofs establishes that the accumulator ΛΛΛ precisely encapsulates the comprehensive authentication of a sequence PPP across all verification rounds RRR in the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ . Given the foundational elements such as the static alphabet AAA, sequence PPP, shuffling function ΣΣΣ, indicating function ΩΩΩ, and verification condition MΜM, the proof methodically demonstrates how ΛΛΛ, through logical conjunction of all verification outcomes, signifies the universal authentication success of PPP. It argues that if ΛΛΛ is true, then every element pip_ipi​ of PPP has been successfully authenticated within its respective subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for all rounds, signifying the theorem's validity and Ξ Ξ Ξ 's efficacy in secure and rigorous sequence authentication.

Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=R=1β‹€n​M(pi​,xiR​)

Stating that the accumulator ΛΛΛ is the result of performing a logical AND operation (β‹€\bigwedgeβ‹€) over all verification results M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) for each element pip_ipi​ within its specified subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ across all rounds RRR from 1 to nnn.

.

Summary of the Probabilistic Proof via Induction

The probabilistic proof via induction explores the increasing likelihood of the sequence PPP's authentication across rounds within Ξ Ξ Ξ , underpinned by probabilistic conditions. Starting with an assumption for a high probability of successful verification in the base case R=1R=1R=1, it extends this logic through mathematical induction to all rounds, asserting that ΛΛΛ's accuracy in reflecting PPP's authentication approaches certainty as rounds increase. This proof leverages the inherent security and fairness of the verification process MΜM and shuffling function ΣΣΣ, suggesting that with each successive round, the probability that ΛΛΛ correctly signifies PPP's comprehensive authentication nears absolute certainty, thus illustrating Ξ Ξ Ξ 's dynamic and robust verification mechanism.

  1. Probability of success in round R=1R=1R=1:

P(successΒ inΒ R=1)=pP(\text{success in } R=1) = pP(successΒ inΒ R=1)=p
  1. Cumulative probability from R=1R=1R=1 to R=k+1R=k+1R=k+1:

P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k+1)=P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k)β‹…P(successΒ inΒ R=k+1)P(\text{success up to } R=k+1) = P(\text{success up to } R=k) \cdot P(\text{success in } R=k+1)P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k+1)=P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k)β‹…P(successΒ inΒ R=k+1)

Notably, since P(successΒ inΒ R=k+1)=pP(\text{success in } R=k+1) = pP(successΒ inΒ R=k+1)=p due to the independence of rounds, this can also be simplified to:

P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k+1)=P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k)β‹…pP(\text{success up to } R=k+1) = P(\text{success up to } R=k) \cdot pP(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k+1)=P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k)β‹…p
  1. Probability that ΛΛΛ accurately reflects authentication of PPP:

P(Ξ›=true)=lim⁑nβ†’βˆžβˆR=1npP(Ξ› = \text{true}) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \prod_{R=1}^{n} pP(Ξ›=true)=nβ†’βˆžlim​R=1∏n​p

Assuming each round's success is independent and identically distributed, this reflects the increasing certainty of authentication with an increasing number of rounds, given the initial probability of success ppp is greater than 0.50.50.5. .

Summary of the Accumulation of Results Proof of ΛΛΛ

The Accumulation of Results Proof for ΛΛΛ rigorously illustrates how the accumulator ΛΛΛ, through its nuanced definition as the product of conditional probabilities of verification outcomes M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​), serves as a nuanced indicator of the sequence PPP's authentication within the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ . This proof methodologically explores how Ξ›new=∏R=1nPr⁑(M(pi,xiR)=true∣xiR,R)Ξ›_{\text{new}} = \prod_{R=1}^{n} \Pr(Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} | x_i^R, R)Ξ›new​=∏R=1n​Pr(M(pi​,xiR​)=true∣xiR​,R) encapsulates the comprehensive verification success across all rounds RRR, introducing a probability-based perspective to the verification process. It asserts that if Ξ›newΞ›_{\text{new}}Ξ›new​ signifies high probability, it unequivocally demonstrates that each element pip_ipi​ in PPP has been authenticated within its appropriate subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for every round, embodying the operational core and rigorous verification standards of Ξ Ξ Ξ . This proof emphasizes the principle that Ξ›newΞ›_{\text{new}}Ξ›new​'s significance extends beyond mere reflection of successful individual verifications; it represents a holistic authentication of PPP across the entire spectrum of Ξ Ξ Ξ 's verification mechanism, underpinned by a probabilistic model that captures the varying degrees of verification confidence and integrity.

Ξ›new=∏R=1nPr⁑(M(pi,xiR)=true∣xiR,R)Ξ›_{\text{new}} = \prod_{R=1}^{n} \Pr(Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} | x_i^R, R)Ξ›new​=R=1∏n​Pr(M(pi​,xiR​)=true∣xiR​,R)

Summary of the Proof by Contradiction

The Proof by Contradiction within the Rosario-Wang Proofs framework leverages the logical underpinnings of contradiction to reinforce the theorem that ΛΛΛ accurately signifies the sequence PPP's authentication across all rounds in Ξ Ξ Ξ . By initially supposing the theorem's negationβ€”where ΛΛΛ could either falsely represent authentication success or fail to signify authentication despite complete verificationβ€”this proof navigates through potential logical inconsistencies that such assumptions would entail. It delves into two hypothetical scenarios: one where ΛΛΛ is true despite a failure in correct verification for at least one pip_ipi​, and another where ΛΛΛ is false despite all pip_ipi​ being correctly verified. By demonstrating that both scenarios lead to contradictions with the established definitions and operational rules of Ξ Ξ Ξ , such as the nature of MΜM and the logical structure of ΛΛΛ, the proof conclusively affirms the original theorem. This approach not only validates the theorem through the elimination of contradictory premises but also highlights the coherence and logical integrity of Ξ Ξ Ξ 's verification system, illustrating its robust framework for sequence authentication.

βˆ€R∈{1,2,...,n},βˆ€i:(Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR))⇔(M(pi,xiR)=true)\forall R \in \{1, 2, ..., n\}, \forall i: \left( Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \right) \Leftrightarrow \left( Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} \right)βˆ€R∈{1,2,...,n},βˆ€i:(Ξ›=R=1β‹€n​M(pi​,xiR​))⇔(M(pi​,xiR​)=true)

Indicating that ΛΛΛ, the accumulator of verification results, is true if and only if, for every round RRR from 1 to nnn and for every iii, the verification condition M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) holds true, signifying that each pip_ipi​ is correctly verified within its designated subset xiRx_i^RxiR​.

#1: Direct Proof


Given a multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony (Ξ Ξ Ξ ), we construct a Direct Proof of the theorem stating that the effective accumulation of verification results (ΛΛΛ) accurately encapsulates the comprehensive authentication of sequence PPP across all rounds RRR, underlined by Ξ Ξ Ξ .

Theorem to Prove

If the conjunction Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​) holds true, then the sequence P={p1,p2,…,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,…,pn​} is authenticated against the dynamically shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR across all rounds RRR. This authentication ensures that the union of all shuffled alphabets XRX^RXR across every round RRR equals XRX^RXR for each individual round, represented mathematically as ⋃RXR=βˆ€R:XR\bigcup_{R} X^R = \forall R: X^R⋃R​XR=βˆ€R:XR.

Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=R=1β‹€n​M(pi​,xiR​)
P={p1,p2,…,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,…,pn​}
⋃RXR=trueorβˆ€R:XR=true\bigcup_{R} X^R = \text{true} \quad \text{or} \quad \forall R: X^R = \text{true}R⋃​XR=trueorβˆ€R:XR=true

Given:

In the cryptographic protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ , AAA represents a static set of symbols or an alphabet from which the sequence PPP is constructed. The sequence P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,...,pn​} is drawn from AAA for the purpose of authentication. Through the shuffling function ΣΣΣ, AAA is shuffled to generate a shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR for each round RRR of the authentication process. The indicating function ΩΩΩ maps each element pip_ipi​ of PPP to a specific subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ within XRX^RXR, where xiRx_i^RxiR​ is a subset of XRX^RXR, denoted as xiRβŠ†XRx_i^R \subseteq X^RxiRβ€‹βŠ†XR. The verification condition MΜM asserts the presence of pip_ipi​ within the subset xiRx_i^RxiR​, with M(pi,xiR)β‡’trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow \text{true}M(pi​,xiR​)β‡’true yielding true if the assertion holds. This comprehensive framework ensures the accurate verification of each element pip_ipi​ within its designated subset, contributing to the overall authentication process within the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ .

AAA: A static set of symbols or alphabet from which PPP is constructed

P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,...,pn​}

such that PPP is drawn from AAA to be authenticated.

Ξ£(A)β†’XRΞ£(A) \rightarrow X^RΞ£(A)β†’XR

shuffles AAA to produce a shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR for each round RRR.

Ξ©(pi)β†’xiRΞ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^RΞ©(pi​)β†’xiR​

A function indicating the specific subset :

xiRβŠ†XRx_i^R \subseteq X^RxiRβ€‹βŠ†XR

where element pip_ipi​ should be verified.

M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​)

the verification condition that asserts pip_ipi​ is present within the subset

xiRβ‡’truex_i^R \Rightarrow \text{true}xiR​⇒true

, yielding true if the assertion holds.

Steps:

  1. Shuffling and Subset Identification:

    • By the design of Ξ Ξ Ξ , for each round RRR, ΣΣΣ shuffles AAA to generate a unique XRX^RXR, ensuring no two rounds have identical configurations, which enhances the security against replay attacks and ensures unpredictability.

    • For each pip_ipi​ in PPP, ΩΩΩ identifies a specific subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ within XRX^RXR for verification, guided by the operational rules of Ξ Ξ Ξ .

  2. Verification Across Rounds:

    • The verification process M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) is applied to each pip_ipi​ within its designated subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for all rounds RRR. By the assumption that ΛΛΛ is true, we understand M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}M(pi​,xiR​)=true for all iii and RRR, meaning every pip_ipi​ is verified to be correctly positioned within xiRx_i^RxiR​.

  3. Accumulation of Verification Results (ΛΛΛ):

    • ΛΛΛ, as defined, is the logical conjunction (β‹€\bigwedgeβ‹€) of all verification outcomes MΜM across rounds RRR. The truth of ΛΛΛ implies a universal verification success, signifying that each element pip_ipi​ of PPP has been authenticated within its respective subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ across all rounds.

  4. Authentication of PPP:

    • Since ΛΛΛ is true, and given that ΛΛΛ represents the accumulation of successful verifications (MΜM) of PPP against XRX^RXR, it logically follows that PPP has been fully authenticated across the entirety of Ξ Ξ Ξ 's operational span.

Conclusion:

The truth of ΛΛΛ unequivocally indicates that the sequence PPP has been authenticated against the shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR in all rounds RRR, thereby confirming the theorem through direct proof. This demonstrates not only the integrity of Ξ Ξ Ξ 's verification process but also its effectiveness in ensuring the authenticity of PPP within a cryptographically secure and logically rigorous framework.

.

#2: Probabilistic Proof via Induction


The probabilistic proof leveraging mathematical induction offers a compelling argument for the authentication of a sequence PPP against a shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR within the cryptographic protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ . This approach intricately combines the principles of probability theory with mathematical induction to illustrate the increasing certainty of authentication as the protocol progresses through its rounds. Central to this proof is the assumption that with each round RRR, the verification process MΜM applied to elements pip_ipi​ in PPP against their designated subsets xiRx_i^RxiR​ has a high likelihood of success, designated by a probability ppp greater than 0.5. This foundation ensures that at the outset, even in the initial round R=1R=1R=1, the protocol is predisposed towards successful authentication.

By inductively assuming the near-certainty of authentication up to any arbitrary round kkk and extending this to round k+1k+1k+1, the proof effectively demonstrates that the accumulator Ξ›newΞ›_{\text{new}}Ξ›new​, which aggregates the verification results M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) across rounds, becomes an increasingly reliable indicator of PPP's authentication. This logical progression from the base case through the inductive step underscores not just the efficacy of Ξ Ξ Ξ  in verifying PPP but also the role of Ξ›newΞ›_{\text{new}}Ξ›new​ as a metric of comprehensive authentication. The inductive approach highlights the strength of Ξ Ξ Ξ 's verification mechanism, ensuring that with each additional round, the protocol reinforces the sequence PPP's integrity against XRX^RXR, with Ξ›newΞ›_{\text{new}}Ξ›new​ serving as the definitive measure of this continuous authentication process.

Assertion to Prove

The probability that the accumulator Ξ›newΞ›_{\text{new}}Ξ›new​, representing the aggregation of verification results M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​), accurately reflects the comprehensive authentication of sequence PPP across all rounds RRR, approaches certainty (i.e., probability 1) as the number of rounds nnn increases, given a sufficiently secure and unbiased verification process.

Base Case (Round R=1R=1R=1)

  • Assumption: The shuffling function ΣΣΣ generates X1X^1X1 from AAA such that each pip_ipi​ has an equal and independent chance of being correctly positioned within its designated subset xi1x_i^1xi1​ for verification.

  • Probability: Let ppp be the probability that M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}M(pi​,xiR​)=true for a single round, with ppp significantly greater than 0.50.50.5 (indicating a higher likelihood of success than failure for each verification).

  • Observation: For the base case of R=1R=1R=1, if ppp is high, the likelihood that Ξ›newΞ›_{\text{new}}Ξ›new​ correctly signifies the authentication of PPP is also high.

Inductive Step (Assuming Truth for R=kR=kR=k to Show for R=k+1R=k+1R=k+1)

  • Inductive Hypothesis: Assume for R=kR=kR=k rounds, the probability of Ξ›newΞ›_{\text{new}}Ξ›new​ accurately representing the authentication of PPP is very close to 1, given the process's security and unbiased nature.

  • Next Round R=k+1R=k+1R=k+1:

    • When ΣΣΣ shuffles AAA to produce Xk+1X^{k+1}Xk+1, and ΩΩΩ and MΜM operate as defined, the independent probability of successful verification for each pip_ipi​ remains ppp.

    • The addition of round k+1k+1k+1 maintains the probability of success for Ξ›newΞ›_{\text{new}}Ξ›new​ near 1, given the cumulative success from previous rounds and the independent, high probability ppp of success in each round.

Conclusion from Inductive Step

  • By mathematical induction, if Ξ›newΞ›_{\text{new}}Ξ›new​ is likely to accurately reflect PPP's authentication for R=1R=1R=1 and assuming Ξ›newΞ›_{\text{new}}Ξ›new​'s accuracy for R=kR=kR=k leads to its accuracy for R=k+1R=k+1R=k+1, then Ξ›newΞ›_{\text{new}}Ξ›new​ is highly likely to be true for all rounds RRR, signaling comprehensive authentication of PPP.


Probaility over Inductive Rounds

The probabilistic proof for the comprehensive authentication of a sequence PPP against a dynamically shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR across all rounds (RRR) in the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ , we'll employ a strategy that incorporates principles of mathematical induction and probability theory. This approach aims to establish the high likelihood of PPP's authentication when ΛΛΛ aggregates positive verification results across all rounds, under the assumption of certain probabilistic conditions.

Formalization of the Probablistic Proof

To formalize a probabilistic proof of the comprehensive authentication of a sequence PPP across all rounds in the multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony (Ξ Ξ Ξ ), let's define the necessary formulaic sequences and equations. This formulation will rely on establishing a probability model that demonstrates the efficacy of ΛΛΛ in representing the true authentication of PPP as the number of rounds nnn increases.

Given a sufficiently secure and unbiased verification process ensured by ΣΣΣ and MΜM, and the probabilistic advantage conferred by ppp, the probabilistic proof via induction confirms that the likelihood of ΛΛΛ accurately representing the complete authentication of PPP approaches certainty as the number of rounds increases. This methodological approach not only validates the robustness of Ξ Ξ Ξ 's verification system but also affirms its capacity to adapt and respond to the dynamic challenges of sequence authentication in a cryptographic context. Through the application of this probabilistic induction proof, Ξ Ξ Ξ  emerges as a sophisticated and reliable protocol for ensuring the security and authenticity of sequences within a probabilistically modeled framework.

Given Variables and Parameters

  • Let AAA represent the static alphabet.

  • Let P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,...,pn​} be the sequence to be authenticated.

  • Let XR=Ξ£(A)X^R = Ξ£(A)XR=Ξ£(A) denote the shuffled alphabet for round RRR, generated by the shuffling function ΣΣΣ.

  • Let Ξ©(pi)β†’xiRΞ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^RΞ©(pi​)β†’xiR​ denote the indicating function that specifies the subset within XRX^RXR for the verification of pip_ipi​.

  • Let M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) be the binary verification function yielding true if pip_ipi​ is correctly verified within xiRx_i^RxiR​.

  • Let ppp represent the probability that M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}M(pi​,xiR​)=true for a given pip_ipi​ in round RRR, with the assumption that p>0.5p > 0.5p>0.5, indicating a favorable chance of successful verification.

Probabilistic Proof

Theoretical Base Case: R=1R=1R=1

  • Probability of M(pi,xi1)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^1) = \text{true}M(pi​,xi1​)=true for each pip_ipi​: P(successΒ inΒ R=1)=pP(\text{success in } R=1) = pP(successΒ inΒ R=1)=p.

Inductive Step: From R=kR=kR=k to R=k+1R=k+1R=k+1

  • Inductive Hypothesis: Assume that the probability P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k)P(\text{success up to } R=k)P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k) approaches 1 as kkk increases, based on the cumulative success of verifying each pip_ipi​ in their respective xiRx_i^RxiR​ with probability ppp in each round.

  • For Round R=k+1R=k+1R=k+1:

    • The probability of success for round k+1k+1k+1, independent of previous rounds, remains ppp.

    • The cumulative probability of success from R=1R=1R=1 to R=k+1R=k+1R=k+1 can be represented as:

P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k+1)=P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k)Γ—P(successΒ inΒ R=k+1)P(\text{success up to } R=k+1) = P(\text{success up to } R=k) \times P(\text{success in } R=k+1)P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k+1)=P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k)Γ—P(successΒ inΒ R=k+1)

Given P(successΒ inΒ R=k+1)=pP(\text{success in } R=k+1) = pP(successΒ inΒ R=k+1)=p, and assuming P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k)P(\text{success up to } R=k)P(successΒ upΒ toΒ R=k) approaches 1, the product also approaches 1, implying high efficacy of ΛΛΛ in authenticating PPP.

Accumulation of Verification Results (ΛΛΛ)

  • The formal representation of ΛΛΛ as the logical AND (β‹€\bigwedgeβ‹€) of all verification outcomes across nnn rounds is modeled by the equation:

Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=R=1β‹€n​M(pi​,xiR​)
  • The probability that ΛΛΛ accurately reflects the authentication of PPP is then modeled as:

P(Ξ›=true)=lim⁑nβ†’βˆžβˆR=1npP(Ξ› = \text{true}) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \prod_{R=1}^{n} pP(Ξ›=true)=nβ†’βˆžlim​R=1∏n​p

Conclusion

The formulaic sequence and equations provided model the probability that the accumulation of verification results (ΛΛΛ) effectively authenticates the sequence PPP in Ξ Ξ Ξ . Under the assumption of a secure verification process and a fair shuffling mechanism, the model demonstrates that as the number of rounds nnn increases, the likelihood of ΛΛΛ representing true authentication of PPP approaches certainty. This probabilistic proof underscores the robustness of Ξ Ξ Ξ  in ensuring the sequence PPP's integrity across a dynamic verification framework.

.

#3: Accumulation of Results Proof of (ΛΛΛ)


The accumulator ΛΛΛ in the cryptographic protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ  plays a pivotal role in the authentication process of a sequence PPP against a dynamically shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR through all rounds RRR. This process is contingent upon the successful verification of each element pip_ipi​ within the designated subset xiRx_i^RxiR​. With AAA as the foundational alphabet, the protocol intricately shuffles AAA into XRX^RXR for each round using the shuffling function ΣΣΣ, thereby ensuring a unique configuration for each verification instance. This unique setup, alongside the indicating function ΩΩΩ that specifies the subset for verification, and the verification condition MΜM affirming the presence of pip_ipi​ in xiRx_i^RxiR​, establishes a robust framework for sequence authentication.

To establish the theorem that ΛΛΛ accurately reflects PPP's authentication, two directions of logic are explored. The forward direction asserts that if ΛΛΛ is true, then all verification conditions M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) across rounds RRR must be positive, signifying successful authentication of each pip_ipi​ within its respective subset xiRx_i^RxiR​. Conversely, the backward direction posits that the verification of each pip_ipi​ within the correct subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for all rounds necessarily leads to the truth of ΛΛΛ, thereby substantiating KΚK (Kβ‡”Ξ›Ξš \Leftrightarrow Ξ›K⇔Λ) as the ultimate proof of knowledge. This logical framework underscores the necessity and sufficiency of ΛΛΛ for the comprehensive verification of PPP, attesting to the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ 's efficacy in ensuring the integrity and authenticity of the sequence authentication process.

Theorem

In Ξ Ξ Ξ , the accumulator ΛΛΛ unequivocally reflects the sequence PPP's authentication against the shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR across all rounds RRR, contingent on the verification of every element pip_ipi​ within the appropriate subset xiRx_i^RxiR​.

Given:

Within the cryptographic protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ , a series of fundamental elements form the basis for sequence authentication:

  • AAA, representing the alphabet, serves as the foundational source from which both the sequence PPP and the shuffled alphabets XRX^RXR are derived. Each element of PPP, denoted as pip_ipi​, is drawn from this static set of symbols.

  • P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,...,pn​} constitutes the sequence subject to verification within the protocol. It comprises indexed elements pip_ipi​ selected from the alphabet AAA, ready for authentication.

  • Ξ£(A)β†’XRΞ£(A) \rightarrow X^RΞ£(A)β†’XR embodies the shuffling function employed in each round RRR of the protocol. This function operates on the alphabet AAA to generate a distinct shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR for every iteration, enhancing the security and randomness of the authentication process.

  • Ξ©(pi)β†’xiRΞ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^RΞ©(pi​)β†’xiR​ plays a pivotal role in pinpointing the specific subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ within the shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR for the verification of each element pip_ipi​ during round RRR. This function ensures that each element is directed to its designated subset for accurate verification.

  • M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) serves as the verification condition crucial for affirming the presence of pip_ipi​ within its designated subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ during the authentication process. This condition yields true if pip_ipi​ is successfully verified within the specified subset, thereby contributing to the robustness and integrity of the authentication mechanism within the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ .

P,XR∼AP, X^R \sim AP,XR∼A
P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,...,pn​}
Ξ£(A)=XRΞ£(A) = X^RΞ£(A)=XR
Ξ©(pi)=xiRΞ©(p_i) = x_i^RΞ©(pi​)=xiR​
M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}M(pi​,xiR​)=true

To Prove:

The equation Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​) holds true if and only if all pip_ipi​ align with their corresponding xiRx_i^RxiR​. In the forward direction (β‡’β‡’β‡’), the truth of ΛΛΛ indicates that all verification conditions M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) across all rounds RRR are met, confirming the successful validation of each pip_ipi​ within xiRx_i^RxiR​. Conversely, in the backward direction (⇐⇐⇐), if every pip_ipi​ is verified within its correct xiRx_i^RxiR​ for all rounds RRR, then all M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) must be true, thereby necessitating the truth of ΛΛΛ. This mutual implication validates KΚK as being equivalent to ΛΛΛ, ensuring the authenticity of the sequence authentication process within the protocol.

Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=R=1β‹€n​M(pi​,xiR​)

is true if and only if all pip_ipi​ align with their corresponding xiRx_i^RxiR​.

  • (β‡’ Direction): Assuming ΛΛΛ is true signifies all verification conditions M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) across RRR are affirmative, denoting each pip_ipi​'s successful validation within xiRx_i^RxiR​.

  • (⇐ Direction): Conversely, if each pip_ipi​ is verified within the correct xiRx_i^RxiR​ for all RRR, then all M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) are true, mandating ΛΛΛ's truth, thereby validating KΚK as Kβ‡”Ξ›Ξš \Leftrightarrow Ξ›K⇔Λ.

Conclusion: Thus, ΛΛΛ's truthfulness is both a necessary and sufficient condition for PPP's comprehensive verification against XRX^RXR, attesting to Ξ Ξ Ξ 's effectiveness. .

#4: Proof by Contradiction


Theorem

In the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ , the accumulator of verification results (ΛΛΛ) is true if and only if every element pip_ipi​ of the sequence PPP is verified to be within the correct subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ of XRX^RXR for each round RRR.

Assumption for Contradiction:

Suppose our theorem statement is false. That is, there exist two possibilities under this assumption:

  1. ΛΛΛ is true even though there is at least one pip_ipi​ that is not verified to be within its correct subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for some round RRR.

  2. ΛΛΛ is false even though every pip_ipi​ is verified to be within its correct subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for all rounds RRR.

Exploration of Possibility 1:

  • Given ΛΛΛ is true, by definition, this means Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​) must hold true for all pip_ipi​ and RRR.

  • If there is at least one pip_ipi​ not in its correct subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ yet ΛΛΛ is true, this would imply M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}M(pi​,xiR​)=true for a situation where piβˆ‰xiRp_i \notin x_i^Rpiβ€‹βˆˆ/xiR​, contradicting the definition of MΜM.

  • This contradiction demonstrates that the first possibility cannot occur if ΛΛΛ accurately reflects the verification process, as per the protocol’s logic.

Exploration of Possibility 2:

  • Assuming every pip_ipi​ is verified within its correct subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for all rounds RRR, by definition of MΜM, this should result in

  • for all instances.

  • If ΛΛΛ were false under these conditions, it would imply that the aggregation of all true M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) results in ΛΛΛ being false, which is logically impossible given

Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=R=1β‹€n​M(pi​,xiR​)

is a conjunction of all verification conditions.

  • This logical impossibility confirms that the second possibility is not feasible, reinforcing the accuracy and integrity of ΛΛΛ in aggregating verification outcomes.

Conclusion:

Given the contradictions found in both possible scenarios under the assumption that our theorem statement is false, we conclude that the original statement must be true. Therefore, ΛΛΛ is true if and only if every pip_ipi​ in PPP is verified to be within its correct subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ across all rounds RRR, thereby substantiating the comprehensive verification of PPP within the dynamically secure framework of Ξ Ξ Ξ . This proof by contradiction not only affirms the logical structure of Ξ Ξ Ξ  but also underscores its reliability and validity in sequence authentication.

#5: Extended Proofs ( Accumulation Efficacy)


In the mathematical framework of the multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony (Ξ Ξ Ξ ), which operates on a sequence PPP derived from a static alphabet AAA, we define the processes and validations crucial to the protocol's operation. Initially, during the initialization and shuffling phase, given P={p1,p2,…,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,…,pn​} and AAA as inputs, the shuffling function ΣΣΣ transforms AAA into uniquely shuffled sets XRX^RXR for each verification round RRR. This process enhances security by introducing unpredictability. Subsequently, the witness function ΩΩΩ assigns each pip_ipi​ to a specific subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ within XRX^RXR for verification. The verification condition MΜM then ensures that pip_ipi​ is indeed present within xiRx_i^RxiR​, denoted by M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}M(pi​,xiR​)=true if pip_ipi​ belongs to xiRx_i^RxiR​. This step authenticates each element against its designated subset, ensuring the integrity of the verification process.

Moving on to the accumulation of verification results, the outcomes of MΜM across all rounds are aggregated into ΛΛΛ, represented as Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)\Lambda = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​). This accumulation encapsulates the collective verification success. Finally, the validity of the proof, denoted by KΚK, is established based on the collective truth of ΛΛΛ, expressed as Kβ‡”Ξ›Ξš \Leftrightarrow Ξ›K⇔Λ. In essence, ΛΛΛ serves as a measure of cumulative verification success, and KΚK's validity hinges upon unanimous positive verifications, thereby affirming the authenticity of PPP within the dynamic context of Ξ Ξ Ξ .

In the context of the multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony (Ξ Ξ Ξ ), operating over a sequence PPP derived from a static alphabet AAA, we formalize the operations, verification, and the final synthesis of proof through a detailed mathematical exposition, ensuring clarity and alignment with foundational principles.

Protocol Operation and Verification Rounds

  1. Initialization and Shuffling:

    • Given: P={p1,p2,…,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,…,pn​} and AAA as inputs.

    • Operation: For each verification round RRR, apply ΣΣΣ to AAA to yield XRX^RXR.

XR=Ξ£(A),βˆ€R∈{1,2,…,n}X^R = Ξ£(A), \quad \forall R \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}XR=Ξ£(A),βˆ€R∈{1,2,…,n}

Meaning: ΣΣΣ denotes the shuffling function, transforming AAA into a uniquely shuffled set XRX^RXR for each round, enhancing unpredictability and security.

2. Witness Function and Verification: - Process: ΩΩΩ determines a target subset xiRβŠ†XRx_i^R \subseteq X^RxiRβ€‹βŠ†XR for each pip_ipi​.

Ξ©(pi)β†’xiR,βˆ€i∈{1,2,…,n}Ξ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R, \quad \forall i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}Ξ©(pi​)β†’xiR​,βˆ€i∈{1,2,…,n}

Verification: Assess pip_ipi​'s presence within xiRx_i^RxiR​, denoted by MΜM.

M(pi,xiR)=trueβ€…β€ŠβŸΊβ€…β€Špi∈xiRΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} \iff p_i \in x_i^RM(pi​,xiR​)=true⟺piβ€‹βˆˆxiR​

Implication: This step authenticates each pip_ipi​ against its assigned subset, validating authenticity per round.

Accumulation of Verification Results

  1. Results Accumulation and Proof Validation:

    • Accumulation: Compile outcomes of MΜM across all rounds into ΛΛΛ.

Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)\Lambda = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=R=1β‹€n​M(pi​,xiR​)

Final Proof: Validate KΚK based on the collective truth of ΛΛΛ.

Kβ‡”Ξ›Ξš \Leftrightarrow Ξ›K⇔Λ

Interpretation: ΛΛΛ embodies the cumulative verification success, with KΚK's validity contingent upon unanimous positive verifications, affirming PPP's authentication within the dynamic context of Ξ Ξ Ξ .

Theorem: The effective aggregation of verification results (ΛΛΛ) precisely reflects the comprehensive authentication of sequence PPP across all rounds (RRR), encapsulated by Ξ Ξ Ξ .

Forward Assertion: If ΛΛΛ is true, implying the aggregate of MΜM over RRR is uniformly positive, then each pip_ipi​ is verified within the correct xiRx_i^RxiR​, thus:

Ξ›=trueβ€…β€ŠβŸΉβ€…β€Šβˆ€pi∈P, M(pi,xiR)=true,β€‰βˆ€RΞ› = \text{true} \implies \forall p_i \in P, \, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}, \, \forall RΞ›=trueβŸΉβˆ€piβ€‹βˆˆP,M(pi​,xiR​)=true,βˆ€R

Backward Assertion: Conversely, if each pip_ipi​ is successfully authenticated within its designated subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for all RRR, then ΛΛΛ must be true, encapsulating the protocol’s integrity:

β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)=true,βˆ€iβ€…β€ŠβŸΉβ€…β€ŠΞ›=true\bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}, \forall i \implies Ξ› = \text{true}R=1β‹€n​M(pi​,xiR​)=true,βˆ€iβŸΉΞ›=true

Conclusion: This delineation affirms that ΛΛΛ, as an accumulation of MΜM across rounds, serves as a robust metric for the authentication of PPP, with KΚK as the conclusive proof of knowledge, underscoring Ξ Ξ Ξ 's efficacy in sequence verification within a dynamically secure framework.

To ensure alignment with our established lemmas, axioms, constraints, and systemic framework, we refine the proof of accumulation efficacy to mirror the intricacies and specifications of our system Ξ Ξ Ξ . This revised proof elucidates the critical role of ΛΛΛ in confirming the authentication of the sequence PPP throughout all verification rounds RRR, in accordance with the operational principles and verification logic of Ξ Ξ Ξ .

Extended Proof of Accumulation Efficacy

Theorem: The accumulator ΛΛΛ, through the effective aggregation of verification results, accurately represents the thorough authentication of the sequence PPP across every round RRR within the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ .

Refined Assertions

Forward Assertion: Assuming ΛΛΛ holds true, indicating a universal affirmation of the verification condition MΜM across all rounds RRR, it logically follows that every element pip_ipi​ of PPP has been validated within its respective subset xiRx_i^RxiR​. This assertion can be formally captured as:

Ξ›=trueβ€…β€ŠβŸΉβ€…β€Šβˆ€pi∈P,β€‰βˆ€R, M(pi,xiR)=trueΞ› = \text{true} \implies \forall p_i \in P, \, \forall R, \, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}Ξ›=trueβŸΉβˆ€piβ€‹βˆˆP,βˆ€R,M(pi​,xiR​)=true

This implies that the integrity of ΛΛΛ as true necessitates the successful verification of every pip_ipi​ within its designated xiRx_i^RxiR​ across all rounds, ensuring the completeness and correctness of the sequence PPP authentication.

Backward Assertion: If, for each round RRR, every pip_ipi​ is affirmatively verified within its intended subset xiRx_i^RxiR​, thereby fulfilling the verification condition MΜM, then the cumulative verification result ΛΛΛ must inherently be true. This logical proposition can be succinctly expressed as:

βˆ€i,β€‰βˆ€R, M(pi,xiR)=trueβ€…β€ŠβŸΉβ€…β€ŠΞ›=true\forall i, \, \forall R, \, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} \implies Ξ› = \text{true}βˆ€i,βˆ€R,M(pi​,xiR​)=trueβŸΉΞ›=true

The sufficiency condition mandates that the aggregate verification success of all pip_ipi​ in their corresponding xiRx_i^RxiR​ for every RRR compels the truth of ΛΛΛ, encapsulating the protocol’s verification integrity and the sequential authentication's authenticity.

Conclusion

By analytically delineating both the forward and backward assertions, we solidify the theorem's validity, demonstrating that the truth value of ΛΛΛ—as the logical conjunction of all individual verification outcomes M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​)β€”is both necessary and sufficient for affirming the comprehensive authentication of PPP within the dynamic verification framework of Ξ Ξ Ξ . This refined proof underscores Ξ Ξ Ξ 's robust verification mechanism, ensuring PPP's integrity and validating KΚK as the definitive proof of knowledge. Through this elaboration, ΠΠΠ’s efficacy in securely authenticating sequences within a dynamically secure and algorithmically precise environment is irrefutably established, adhering to the rigorous standards set forth by our system's lemmas, axioms, and constraints.


Axioms and Lemmas

Axioms

Axiom of Initialization: The protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ  commences with a predefined sequence PPP, comprised of elements p1p_1p1​ to pnp_npn​, and a static alphabet AAA. For each verification round RRR, the shuffling function ΣΣΣ generates a fresh and unpredictable shuffled version of AAA, denoted as XRX^RXR. This axiom ensures that the protocol begins with a consistent sequence and introduces variability through shuffled alphabets in each round.

  • Equation: P={p1,p2,...,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, ..., p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,...,pn​}, XR=Ξ£(A)X^R = Ξ£(A)XR=Ξ£(A) for R=1,2,...,nR = 1, 2, ..., nR=1,2,...,n.

  • Expression: This axiom establishes the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ  begins with a predefined sequence PPP, consisting of elements p1p_1p1​ to pnp_npn​, and a static alphabet AAA. For each verification round RRR, a shuffled version of AAA, denoted as XRX^RXR, is produced through the shuffling function ΣΣΣ, ensuring fresh and unpredictable challenges in each round.

Axiom of Random Distribution: Each round RRR of the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ  produces a distinct shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR from the static alphabet AAA via the shuffling function ΣΣΣ. The axiom asserts that for differing rounds RRR and Rβ€²R'Rβ€², the shuffled alphabets XRX^RXR and XRβ€²X^{R'}XRβ€² are distinct (XRβ‰ XRβ€²X^R \neq X^{R'}XRξ€ =XRβ€²). This condition ensures the unpredictability and non-repetitive nature of the challenges encountered in successive rounds, vital for enhancing the security of the verification process.

  • Equation: XR=Ξ£(A)X^R = Ξ£(A)XR=Ξ£(A), ensuring XRβ‰ XRβ€²X^R \neq X^{R'}XRξ€ =XRβ€² for Rβ‰ Rβ€²R \neq R'Rξ€ =Rβ€².

  • Expression: This asserts that each round RRR of the protocol generates a uniquely shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR from AAA, via ΣΣΣ. The condition XRβ‰ XRβ€²X^R \neq X^{R'}XRξ€ =XRβ€² for differing rounds ensures that the sequence of challenges is non-repetitive and unpredictable, fundamental for securing the verification process.

Axiom of Sequence Verification: For every element pip_ipi​ within the sequence PPP, there exists a designated subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ within the shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR where pip_ipi​ can be located and verified. This axiom emphasizes the protocol's capability to identify and authenticate individual elements of the sequence, ensuring the integrity of the verification process.

  • Equation: Existence of xiRx_i^RxiR​ such that pi∈xiRp_i \in x_i^Rpiβ€‹βˆˆxiR​ for each pip_ipi​ in PPP.

  • Expression: For every element pip_ipi​ within the sequence PPP, there exists a targeted subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ within the shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR where pip_ipi​ can be found and verified. This axiom underscores the protocol's capacity to pinpoint and verify individual sequence elements.

Axiom of Completeness: The axiom asserts that for all elements pip_ipi​ within the sequence PPP, there exists at least one subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ within the shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR where the verification condition MΜM returns true (M(pi,xiR)=trueΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}M(pi​,xiR​)=true). This ensures comprehensive verification of every element of PPP throughout the execution of the protocol, reinforcing its reliability and completeness.

  • Equation: βˆ€pi∈P,βˆƒxiR∈XR:M(pi,xiR)=true\forall p_i \in P, \exists x_i^R \in X^R : Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}βˆ€piβ€‹βˆˆP,βˆƒxiRβ€‹βˆˆXR:M(pi​,xiR​)=true.

  • Expression: Signifies that for all elements pip_ipi​ within PPP, there must be a subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ in XRX^RXR for which the verification condition MΜM returns true, ensuring every element of PPP is verified throughout the protocol's execution.

Axiom of Non-collision: This axiom guarantees the uniqueness of the generated shuffled alphabets XRX^RXR and their corresponding subsets xiRx_i^RxiR​ across different rounds. It ensures that no collisions occur in the generation process, maintaining the integrity of the verification process by preventing identical shuffles or subsets from appearing in multiple rounds.

  • Equation: Unique generation of XRX^RXR and xiRx_i^RxiR​, preventing collisions.

  • Expression: Guarantees that the generation process for XRX^RXR and its subsets xiRx_i^RxiR​ produces unique configurations, ensuring the integrity of the verification process by avoiding identical shuffles or subsets across different rounds.

Lemmas

Lemma of Witness Validity: This lemma asserts that if the witness function ΩΩΩ correctly identifies the subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for an element pip_ipi​ and the subsequent verification MΜM confirms the presence of pip_ipi​ within xiRx_i^RxiR​, then the verification of pip_ipi​ for that specific round is considered valid. Mathematically, it can be expressed as Ξ©(pi)β†’xiR∧M(pi,xiR)=trueΞ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R \land Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}Ξ©(pi​)β†’xiRβ€‹βˆ§M(pi​,xiR​)=true, indicating the conjunction of ΩΩΩ and MΜM as criteria for valid verification.

  • Equation: Ξ©(pi)β†’xiR∧M(pi,xiR)=trueΞ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R \land Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}Ξ©(pi​)β†’xiRβ€‹βˆ§M(pi​,xiR​)=true.

  • Expression: States that if the witness function ΩΩΩ accurately identifies the subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for an element pip_ipi​, and the verification MΜM confirms pip_ipi​'s presence in xiRx_i^RxiR​, then pip_ipi​'s verification for that round is deemed valid.

Lemma of Comprehensive Verification: This lemma signifies that the sequence PPP achieves full authentication against the shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR if, for each round RRR, the verification condition MΜM holds true for every pip_ipi​ within its designated subset xiRx_i^RxiR​. Mathematically, it is represented as β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)β‡’PΒ authenticated\bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow P \text{ authenticated}β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​)β‡’PΒ authenticated, emphasizing the comprehensive nature of the verification process across all rounds.

  • Equation: β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)β‡’PΒ authenticated\bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow P \text{ authenticated}β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​)β‡’PΒ authenticated.

  • Expression: Indicates that the sequence PPP is fully authenticated against the shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR if, for all rounds RRR, the verification condition MΜM for each pip_ipi​ within its respective subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ holds true.

Lemma of Accumulative Proof: In this lemma, the final proof of knowledge KΚK is validated if the accumulator ΛΛΛ, which aggregates all verification outcomes MΜM across rounds RRR, evaluates to true. This lemma encapsulates the protocol's integrity by affirming the authentication of the sequence PPP through cumulative verification success. Mathematically, it is denoted as Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)β‡’K=trueΞ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow Κ = \text{true}Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​)β‡’K=true.

  • Equation: Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)β‡’K=trueΞ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow Κ = \text{true}Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​)β‡’K=true.

  • Expression: Explains that the final proof of knowledge KΚK is validated if the accumulator ΛΛΛ, which aggregates all verification outcomes MΜM across rounds RRR, is true. This encapsulates the protocol's integrity by affirming the sequence PPP's authentication through cumulative verification success.

Lemma of Dynamic Adaptability: Asserting the protocol's ability to adapt to varying sizes of the sequence PPP and alphabet AAA without compromising integrity, this lemma highlights the scalability and adaptability of ΠΠΠ. Mathematically, it states the adaptation without loss of ΠΠΠ integrity, expressed as ∣P∣|P|∣P∣ and ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ varying without affecting the protocol's integrity.

  • Equation: Adaptation to varying ∣P∣|P|∣P∣ and ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ without loss of Ξ Ξ Ξ  integrity.

  • Expression: Asserts that the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ  can flexibly adjust to different sizes of the sequence PPP and alphabet AAA without compromising its verification integrity or security, demonstrating Ξ Ξ Ξ 's scalability and adaptability.

Lemma of Security Enhancement: This lemma emphasizes the protocol's enhanced security against cryptographic and brute-force threats due to the unpredictability introduced by the shuffling function ΣΣΣ, creating a dynamic and secure verification environment. Mathematically, it states the security enhancement as Ξ£(A)β†’XRΞ£(A) \rightarrow X^RΞ£(A)β†’XR, underlining the crucial role of ΣΣΣ in bolstering security measures within the protocol.

  • Equation: Enhanced security through unpredictability, Ξ£(A)β†’XRΞ£(A) \rightarrow X^RΞ£(A)β†’XR.

  • Expression: Highlights that security against cryptographic and brute-force threats is significantly enhanced by the unpredictability factor introduced through the shuffling function ΣΣΣ, creating a dynamic and secure verification environment.

Constraints

Constraint of Round Completeness:

  • Equation: βˆ€R,M(pi,xiR)Β mustΒ complete\forall R, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \text{ must complete}βˆ€R,M(pi​,xiR​)Β mustΒ complete.

  • Expression: This constraint mandates that in every round RRR, the verification process MΜM for each element pip_ipi​ within its designated subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ must be fully executed, ensuring no part of the verification cycle is left incomplete.

Constraint of Subset Uniqueness:

  • Equation: xiRβ‰ xjRβ€²x_i^R \neq x_j^{R'}xiR​=xjR′​ for Rβ‰ Rβ€²R \neq R'Rξ€ =Rβ€² or iβ‰ ji \neq jiξ€ =j.

  • Expression: To maintain the integrity of the verification process, each subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ generated for a round RRR must be unique. This prevents any potential overlap or repetition of subsets across different rounds, reinforcing the security and robustness of Ξ Ξ Ξ .

Constraint of Proof Consistency:

  • Equation: Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)β‡’K=trueΞ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow Κ = \text{true}Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​)β‡’K=true.

  • Expression: The validation of the proof of knowledge KΚK hinges on the consistent truth of all verification outcomes MΜM aggregated in ΛΛΛ. This ensures that KΚK is declared true only if every element pip_ipi​ of PPP is successfully verified across all rounds RRR.

Constraint of Witness Integrity:

  • Equation: Ξ©(pi)Β mustΒ beΒ verifiableΒ againstΒ PΞ©(p_i) \text{ must be verifiable against } PΞ©(pi​)Β mustΒ beΒ verifiableΒ againstΒ P.

  • Expression: The witness ΩΩΩ, indicating where an element pip_ipi​ should be found within XRX^RXR, must be reliably linked to the prover's knowledge of the sequence PPP. This guards against misleading or incorrect indications that could compromise the verification integrity.

Constraint of Verification Transparency:

  • Equation: M(pi,xiR)∧KΒ mustΒ beΒ externallyΒ verifiableΜ(p_i, x_i^R) \land Κ \text{ must be externally verifiable}M(pi​,xiR​)∧KΒ mustΒ beΒ externallyΒ verifiable.

  • Expression: The process underscores the necessity for both the verification outcomes MΜM and the final proof KΚK to be transparent and amenable to external verification. This openness fosters trust and verifiability in the authentication process implemented by Ξ Ξ Ξ .

Principles

  • Principle of Sequential Integrity:

    • Equation: Orderly M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) preserves PPP integrity.

    • Expression: The orderly execution of verification MΜM for elements within PPP, following the sequence integrity, ensures the robustness of the authentication process, guaranteeing that each step follows logically from the previous one without breaches in logical continuity.

  • Principle of Protocol Security:

    • Equation: Ξ£(A)βˆ§β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)βˆ§Ξ›β‡’secureΒ Ξ Ξ£(A) \land \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \land Ξ› \Rightarrow \text{secure } Ξ Ξ£(A)βˆ§β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​)βˆ§Ξ›β‡’secureΒ Ξ .

    • Expression: The security of the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ  is reinforced through the combination of unpredictable shuffling (ΣΣΣ), thorough verification (MΜM) across all rounds, and the cumulative confirmation (ΛΛΛ) of these verifications, creating a robust defense against unauthorized access and manipulation.

  • Principle of Verifiability:

    • Equation: External verification of M∧KΜ \land ΚM∧K.

    • Expression: Emphasizes the protocol's capacity for its verification steps and the final proof to be validated by third parties, enhancing the overall credibility and trustworthiness of Ξ Ξ Ξ .

  • Principle of Non-repudiation:

    • Equation: ΛΛΛ documents verification, preventing denial.

    • Expression: The documentation and aggregation of verification results in ΛΛΛ serve as a solid foundation for non-repudiation, ensuring that once an authentication claim is made, it cannot be denied or disputed.

Implications

  • Implication of Continuity:

    • Equation: Ξ Ξ Ξ  mechanism for re-verification or secure termination after failure.

    • Expression: This ensures that Ξ Ξ Ξ  includes mechanisms to either allow for the re-verification of elements upon failure or to securely terminate the session, safeguarding the integrity of the process and preventing potential security breaches.

  • Implication of Evolution:

    • Equation: Ξ Ξ Ξ  updates to cryptographic methods without negating past validations.

    • Expression: Ξ Ξ Ξ  is designed to be future-proof, permitting updates and enhancements to its cryptographic methodologies without invalidating previously authenticated sequences. This adaptability ensures that Ξ Ξ Ξ  remains relevant and secure in the face of evolving cryptographic landscapes.


Rosario-Wang Protocol

Initialization of the Protocol (Ξ )

  1. Protocol Initialization:

    • Let Ξ Ξ Ξ  denote the entire proof of knowledge protocol.

    • AAA represents the static alphabet from which sequences are generated.

    • P={p1,p2,…,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,…,pn​} is the sequence to be authenticated, with pip_ipi​ being the iii-th element of PPP.

Preparation of the Alphabet and Shuffled Alphabet

  1. Alphabet Preparation and Shuffling:

    • XRX^RXR represents the shuffled alphabet derived from AAA for round RRR, where R=1,2,…,nR = 1, 2, \ldots, nR=1,2,…,n.

    • The shuffling process per round is defined by Ξ£(A)β†’XRΞ£(A) \rightarrow X^RΞ£(A)β†’XR, ensuring each XRX^RXR is a unique permutation of AAA.

Generation of the Sequence and its Verification

  1. Sequence Generation and Subset Selection:

    • For each round RRR, a subset xiRβŠ†XRx_i^R \subseteq X^RxiRβ€‹βŠ†XR is targeted for verification. Here, iii corresponds to the targeted index within PPP for that round.

    • The selection of xiRx_i^RxiR​ for a given pi∈Pp_i \in Ppiβ€‹βˆˆP is guided by a witness ΩΩΩ, which indicates the appropriate subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ where pip_ipi​ should be found.

Verification Process

  1. Verification and Witness:

    • The verification condition for round RRR is denoted as M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​), checking if pip_ipi​ is present within xiRx_i^RxiR​.

    • The witness Ξ©(pi)β†’xiRΞ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^RΞ©(pi​)β†’xiR​ links pip_ipi​ to its corresponding subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for verification.

Result Accumulation and Proof of Knowledge

  1. Result Accumulation and Conclusion:

    • The accumulation of verification results across all rounds RRR is captured by Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​), where ΛΛΛ is true iff all instances of MΜM are true.

    • The final proof of knowledge, KΚK, is validated iff ΛΛΛ is true, denoted mathematically as Kβ‡”Ξ›Ξš \Leftrightarrow Ξ›K⇔Λ.

Notational Summary

  • Ξ Ξ Ξ : The multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony.

  • AAA: The static alphabet.

  • PPP: The sequence to be authenticated.

  • XRX^RXR: The shuffled alphabet for round RRR.

  • xiRx_i^RxiR​: The subset of XRX^RXR targeted in round RRR.

  • ΣΣΣ: The random distribution function that generates XRX^RXR from AAA.

  • ΩΩΩ: The witness function that indicates the subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for verification of pip_ipi​.

  • MΜM: The verification condition for a member pip_ipi​ in subset xiRx_i^RxiR​.

  • ΛΛΛ: The accumulator of verification results across rounds.

  • KΚK: The final proof of knowledge, affirming the authenticity of PPP.


  1. Protocol and Sequence Declaration:

    • Ξ Ξ Ξ : Proof of knowledge protocol.

    • P={p1,p2,…,pn}P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\}P={p1​,p2​,…,pn​}: Sequence to be authenticated.

  2. Alphabet and Shuffling:

    • AAA: Static alphabet.

    • XR=Ξ£(A)X^R = Ξ£(A)XR=Ξ£(A): Shuffled alphabet XXX for round RRR, obtained by applying the shuffling function ΣΣΣ to AAA.

  3. Subset Selection and Verification:

    • xiRx_i^RxiR​: Subset of XRX^RXR targeted in round RRR for verifying element pip_ipi​.

    • Ξ©(pi)β†’xiRΞ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^RΞ©(pi​)β†’xiR​: Witness function indicating the subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ where pip_ipi​ is expected to be found for verification.

  4. Verification Condition:

    • M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​): Verification condition for round RRR, checking if pip_ipi​ is present within xiRx_i^RxiR​.

  5. Result Accumulation and Proof of Knowledge:

    • Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​): Accumulator of verification results across all rounds RRR, where ΛΛΛ is true if and only if all instances of MΜM are true.

    • Kβ‡”Ξ›Ξš \Leftrightarrow Ξ›K⇔Λ: The final proof of knowledge KΚK is validated if and only if ΛΛΛ is true.

PreviousThe Rosario-Wang PrimitiveNextWhite Paper : Accumulation of Memberships

Last updated 1 year ago