Eni6ma - Rosario-Wang Proof Cypher
Eni6ma - Rosario-Wang Proof Cypher
  • The Eni6ma Cypher (Rosario-Wang Proof)
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On this page
  • Table of Symbolic Keys
  • Axioms and Lemmas
  • Rosario-Wang Proof Protocol
  • Initialization of the Protocol (Ξ )
  • Preparation of the Alphabet and Shuffled Alphabet
  • Generation of the Sequence and its Verification
  • Verification Process
  • Result Accumulation and Proof of Knowledge
  • Notational Summary
  • Mathematical Formulation
  • Accumulation of Verification Results
  • Proof of Accumulation Efficacy
  • Extended Proof of Accumulation Efficacy
  • Table of Functions and Operators
  1. The Patent & Innovation

Verification Protocol

Eni6ma Technology and the Rosario-Wang Proof/Cypher is Patent Pending. USPTO 2024. Copyright 2024 All right reserved. Eni6ma.org - Dylan Rosario

PreviousAttack Vector Are ObsoleteNextQuantum Manifolds

Last updated 1 year ago

Table of Symbolic Keys

  1. Component (Ξ )

    • DESC: [Method] Interactive multi-round proof ceremony for sequence authentication.

  2. Alphabet (A)

    • DESC: [Member] Static set of words from which sequences are generated.

  3. Shuffled Alphabet XR X^R XR

    • DESC: [Member] Randomly ordered alphabet derived from A for each round R.

  4. Sequence (P)

    • DESC: [Member] Indexed array of members selected from A for verification.

  5. Subset of XRX^RXR ( xiRx_i^RxiR​ )

    • DESC: [Variable] Specific subset of XRX^RXR targeted in each verification round R.

  6. Number of Subsets (n)

    • DESC: [Variable] Total subsets in X, correlating to the rounds in the verification process.

  7. Index of $P$ (Ξ΄)

    • DESC: [Variable] Index within P being verified in the current round R.

  8. Witness (Ξ©)

    • DESC: [Function] Indicator provided by the authenticator for the subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ containing element pnp_npn​.

  9. Random Distribution per Round (Ξ£)

    • DESC: [Function] Random organization of A into XRX^RXR, and its division into subsets for each round R.

  10. Membership Verification per Round (Μ)

    • DESC: [Condition] Verification condition applied per round to confirm the presence of pnp_npn​ in xiRx_i^RxiR​.

  11. Accumulation of Verification Results (Ξ›)

    • DESC: [Constraint] Aggregates the verification results from each round, requiring all true for Κ.

  12. Round (R)

    • DESC: [Member] Each cycle of the protocol where a new Ξ£ is generated, and Μ is verified against xiRx_i^RxiR​.

  13. Proof of Knowledge (Κ)

    • DESC: [Result] The final validation, confirming the authenticator's knowledge of sequence P.


Axioms and Lemmas

Axioms

  1. Axiom of Initialization:

  2. Axiom of Random Distribution:

  3. Axiom of Sequence Verification:

  4. Axiom of Completeness:

  5. Axiom of Non-collision:

Lemmas

  1. Lemma of Witness Validity:

  2. Lemma of Comprehensive Verification:

  3. Lemma of Accumulative Proof:

  4. Lemma of Dynamic Adaptability:

  5. Lemma of Security Enhancement:

Constraints with Expressive Statements

  1. Constraint of Round Completeness:

  2. Constraint of Subset Uniqueness:

  3. Constraint of Proof Consistency:

  4. Constraint of Witness Integrity:

  5. Constraint of Verification Transparency:

Principles with Expressive Statements

  • Principle of Sequential Integrity:

  • Principle of Protocol Security:

  • Principle of Verifiability:

  • Principle of Non-repudiation:

Systemic Implications with Expressive Statements

  • Implication of Continuity:

  • Implication of Evolution:


Rosario-Wang Proof Protocol

Initialization of the Protocol (Ξ )

  1. Protocol Initialization:

Preparation of the Alphabet and Shuffled Alphabet

  1. Alphabet Preparation and Shuffling:

Generation of the Sequence and its Verification

  1. Sequence Generation and Subset Selection:

Verification Process

  1. Verification and Witness:

Result Accumulation and Proof of Knowledge

  1. Result Accumulation and Conclusion:

Notational Summary


  1. Protocol and Sequence Declaration:

  2. Alphabet and Shuffling:

  3. Subset Selection and Verification:

  4. Verification Condition:

  5. Result Accumulation and Proof of Knowledge:


Mathematical Formulation

In the context of the multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony ($Ξ $), operating over a sequence $P$ derived from a static alphabet $A$, we formalize the operations, verification, and the final synthesis of proof through a detailed mathematical exposition, ensuring clarity and alignment with foundational principles.

Protocol Operation and Verification Rounds

  1. Initialization and Shuffling:

Accumulation of Verification Results

  1. Results Accumulation and Proof Validation:

Proof of Accumulation Efficacy

Extended Proof of Accumulation Efficacy

Theorem: The accumulator $Ξ›$, through the effective aggregation of verification results, accurately represents the thorough authentication of the sequence $P$ across every round $R$ within the protocol $Ξ $.

Refined Assertions

Conclusion

Table of Functions and Operators

Following key of operators

Function/Operator
Symbol/Notation
Description

Shuffled

Indicating

Verifying

Authenticated

Expected

For Round

Present Within

Accumulator

Accumulates verification results across all rounds.

Across All Rounds

Is True If and Only If

Validated If

List of Equations

  1. Shuffling Function:

  2. Indicating Function:

  3. Verification Condition:

  4. Authentication Relation:

  5. Accumulation of Results:

Equation: P = {p_1, p_2, ..., p_n}, XR=Ξ£(A)X^R = Ξ£(A)XR=Ξ£(A) for R=1,2,...,nR = 1, 2, ..., nR=1,2,...,n.

Expression: This axiom establishes the protocol $Ξ $ begins with a predefined sequence PPP, consisting of elements p1 p_1 p1​to pnp_npn​, and a static alphabet A. For each verification round R, a shuffled version of A, denoted as XRX^RXR, is produced through the shuffling function Ξ£, ensuring fresh and unpredictable challenges in each round.

Equation: XR=Σ(A)X^R = Σ(A)XR=Σ(A) , ensuring XR≠XR′X^R \neq X^{R'}XR=XR′ for R≠R′R \neq R'R=R′ .

Expression: This asserts that each round RRR of the protocol generates a uniquely shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR from A, via Σ. The condition XR≠XR′X^R \neq X^{R'}XR=XR′ for differing rounds ensures that the sequence of challenges is non-repetitive and unpredictable, fundamental for securing the verification process.

Equation: Existence of xiRx_i^RxiR​ such that pi∈xiRp_i \in x_i^Rpiβ€‹βˆˆxiR​ for each pip_i pi​ in P.

Expression: For every element pi p_i pi​ within the sequence P, there exists a targeted subset xiR x_i^RxiR​ within the shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR where pip_ipi​ can be found and verified. This axiom underscores the protocol's capacity to pinpoint and verify individual sequence elements.

Equation: βˆ€pi∈P,βˆƒxiR∈XR:M(pi,xiR)=true\forall p_i \in P, \exists x_i^R \in X^R : Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}βˆ€piβ€‹βˆˆP,βˆƒxiRβ€‹βˆˆXR:M(pi​,xiR​)=true .

Expression: Signifies that for all elements pip_ipi​ within P, there must be a subset xiR x_i^RxiR​ in XRX^RXR for which the verification condition $Μ$ returns true, ensuring every element of $P$ is verified throughout the protocol's execution.

Equation: Unique generation of XRX^RXR and xiRx_i^RxiR​, preventing collisions.

Expression: Guarantees that the generation process for XRX^RXR and its subsets xiRx_i^RxiR​ produces unique configurations, ensuring the integrity of the verification process by avoiding identical shuffles or subsets across different rounds.

Equation: Ξ©(pi)β†’xiR∧M(pi,xiR)=trueΞ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R \land Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}Ξ©(pi​)β†’xiRβ€‹βˆ§M(pi​,xiR​)=true .

Expression: States that if the witness function Ξ© accurately identifies the subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for an element pip_ipi​, and the verification MΜM confirms pip_ipi​'s presence in xiRx_i^RxiR​, then pip_ipi​'s verification for that round is deemed valid.

Equation: β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)β‡’PΒ authenticated\bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow P \text{ authenticated}β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​)β‡’PΒ authenticated .

Expression: Indicates that the sequence $P$ is fully authenticated against the shuffled alphabet XRX^RXR if, for all rounds R, the verification condition MΜM for each pip_ipi​ within its respective subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ holds true.

Equation: Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)β‡’K=trueΞ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow Κ = \text{true}Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​)β‡’K=true.

Expression: Explains that the final proof of knowledge KΚK is validated if the accumulator ΛΛΛ, which aggregates all verification outcomes MΜM across rounds RRR, is true. This encapsulates the protocol's integrity by affirming the sequence PPP's authentication through cumulative verification success.

Equation: Adaptation to varying ∣P∣|P|∣P∣ and ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ without loss of ΠΠΠ integrity.

Expression: Asserts that the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ  can flexibly adjust to different sizes of the sequence PPP and alphabet AAA without compromising its verification integrity or security, demonstrating Ξ Ξ Ξ 's scalability and adaptability.

Equation: Enhanced security through unpredictability, Ξ£(A)β†’XRΞ£(A) \rightarrow X^RΞ£(A)β†’XR.

Expression: Highlights that security against cryptographic and brute-force threats is significantly enhanced by the unpredictability factor introduced through the shuffling function ΣΣΣ, creating a dynamic and secure verification environment.

Equation: βˆ€R,M(pi,xiR)Β mustΒ complete\forall R, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \text{ must complete}βˆ€R,M(pi​,xiR​)Β mustΒ complete.

Expression: This constraint mandates that in every round RRR, the verification process MΜM for each element pip_ipi​ within its designated subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ must be fully executed, ensuring no part of the verification cycle is left incomplete.

Equation: xiRβ‰ xjRβ€²x_i^R \neq x_j^{R'}xiR​=xjR′​ for Rβ‰ Rβ€²R \neq R'Rξ€ =Rβ€² or iβ‰ ji \neq jiξ€ =j.

Expression: To maintain the integrity of the verification process, each subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ generated for a round RRR must be unique. This prevents any potential overlap or repetition of subsets across different rounds, reinforcing the security and robustness of Ξ Ξ Ξ .

Equation: Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)β‡’K=trueΞ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow Κ = \text{true}Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​)β‡’K=true.

Expression: The validation of the proof of knowledge KΚK hinges on the consistent truth of all verification outcomes MΜM aggregated in ΛΛΛ. This ensures that KΚK is declared true only if every element pip_ipi​ of PPP is successfully verified across all rounds RRR.

Equation: Ξ©(pi)Β mustΒ beΒ verifiableΒ againstΒ PΞ©(p_i) \text{ must be verifiable against } PΞ©(pi​)Β mustΒ beΒ verifiableΒ againstΒ P.

Expression: The witness ΩΩΩ, indicating where an element pip_ipi​ should be found within XRX^RXR, must be reliably linked to the prover's knowledge of the sequence PPP. This guards against misleading or incorrect indications that could compromise the verification integrity.

Equation: M(pi,xiR)∧KΒ mustΒ beΒ externallyΒ verifiableΜ(p_i, x_i^R) \land Κ \text{ must be externally verifiable}M(pi​,xiR​)∧KΒ mustΒ beΒ externallyΒ verifiable.

Expression: The process underscores the necessity for both the verification outcomes MΜM and the final proof KΚK to be transparent and amenable to external verification. This openness fosters trust and verifiability in the authentication process implemented by ΠΠΠ.

Equation: Orderly M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​) preserves PPP integrity.

Expression: The orderly execution of verification MΜM for elements within PPP, following the sequence integrity, ensures the robustness of the authentication process, guaranteeing that each step follows logically from the previous one without breaches in logical continuity.

Equation: Ξ£(A)βˆ§β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)βˆ§Ξ›β‡’secureΒ Ξ Ξ£(A) \land \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \land Ξ› \Rightarrow \text{secure } Ξ Ξ£(A)βˆ§β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​)βˆ§Ξ›β‡’secureΒ Ξ .

Expression: The security of the protocol Ξ Ξ Ξ  is reinforced through the combination of unpredictable shuffling (ΣΣΣ), thorough verification (MΜM) across all rounds, and the cumulative confirmation (ΛΛΛ) of these verifications, creating a robust defense against unauthorized access and manipulation.

Equation: External verification of M∧KΜ \land ΚM∧K.

Expression: Emphasizes the protocol's capacity for its verification steps and the final proof to be validated by third parties, enhancing the overall credibility and trustworthiness of Ξ Ξ Ξ .

Equation: ΛΛΛ documents verification, preventing denial.

Expression: The documentation and aggregation of verification results in ΛΛΛ serve as a solid foundation for non-repudiation, ensuring that once an authentication claim is made, it cannot be denied or disputed.

Equation: Ξ Ξ Ξ  mechanism for re-verification or secure termination after failure.

Expression: This ensures that Ξ Ξ Ξ  includes mechanisms to either allow for the re-verification of elements upon failure or to securely terminate the session, safeguarding the integrity of the process and preventing potential security breaches.

Equation: Ξ Ξ Ξ  updates to cryptographic methods without negating past validations.

Expression: Ξ Ξ Ξ  is designed to be future-proof, permitting updates and enhancements to its cryptographic methodologies without invalidating previously authenticated sequences. This adaptability ensures that Ξ Ξ Ξ  remains relevant and secure in the face of evolving cryptographic landscapes.

Let Ξ Ξ Ξ  denote the entire proof of knowledge protocol.

AAA represents the static alphabet from which sequences are generated.

P=p1,p2,…,pnP = {p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n}P=p1​,p2​,…,pn​ is the sequence to be authenticated, with pip_ipi​ being the iii-th element of PPP.

XRX^RXR represents the shuffled alphabet derived from AAA for round RRR, where R=1,2,…,nR = 1, 2, \ldots, nR=1,2,…,n.

The shuffling process per round is defined by Ξ£(A)β†’XRΞ£(A) \rightarrow X^RΞ£(A)β†’XR, ensuring each XRX^RXR is a unique permutation of AAA.

For each round RRR, a subset xiRβŠ†XRx_i^R \subseteq X^RxiRβ€‹βŠ†XR is targeted for verification. Here, iii corresponds to the targeted index within PPP for that round.

The selection of xiRx_i^RxiR​ for a given pi∈Pp_i \in Ppiβ€‹βˆˆP is guided by a witness ΩΩΩ, which indicates the appropriate subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ where pip_ipi​ should be found.

The verification condition for round RRR is denoted as M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​), checking if pip_ipi​ is present within xiRx_i^RxiR​.

The witness Ξ©(pi)β†’xiRΞ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^RΞ©(pi​)β†’xiR​ links pip_ipi​ to its corresponding subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for verification.

The accumulation of verification results across all rounds RRR is captured by Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​), where ΛΛΛ is true iff all instances of $Μ$ are true.

The final proof of knowledge, KΚK, is validated iff ΛΛΛ is true, denoted mathematically as Kβ‡”Ξ›Ξš \Leftrightarrow Ξ›K⇔Λ.

Ξ Ξ Ξ : The multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony.

AAA: The static alphabet.

PPP: The sequence to be authenticated.

XRX^RXR: The shuffled alphabet for round RRR.

xiRx_i^RxiR​: The subset of XRX^RXR targeted in round RRR.

ΣΣΣ: The random distribution function that generates XRX^RXR from AAA.

ΩΩΩ: The witness function that indicates the subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for verification of pip_ipi​.

MΜM: The verification condition for a member pip_ipi​ in subset xiRx_i^RxiR​.

ΛΛΛ: The accumulator of verification results across rounds.

KΚK: The final proof of knowledge, affirming the authenticity of PPP.

Ξ Ξ Ξ : Proof of knowledge protocol.

P=p1,p2,…,pnP = {p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n}P=p1​,p2​,…,pn​: Sequence to be authenticated.

AAA: Static alphabet.

XR=Σ(A)X^R = Σ(A)XR=Σ(A): Shuffled alphabet XXX for round RRR, obtained by applying the shuffling function ΣΣΣ to A.

xiRx_i^RxiR​ : Subset of XRX^RXR targeted in round RRR for verifying element pip_ipi​.

Ξ©(pi)β†’xiRΞ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^RΞ©(pi​)β†’xiR​: Witness function indicating the subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ where pip_ipi​ is expected to be found for verification.

M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​): Verification condition for round RRR, checking if pip_ipi​ is present within xiRx_i^RxiR​.

Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​): Accumulator of verification results across all rounds RRR, where ΛΛΛ is true if and only if all instances of MΜM are true.

Kβ‡”Ξ›Ξš \Leftrightarrow Ξ›K⇔Λ: The final proof of knowledge KΚK is validated if and only if ΛΛΛ is true.

Given: P=p1,p2,…,pnP = {p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n}P=p1​,p2​,…,pn​ and AAA as inputs.

Operation: For each verification round RRR, apply ΣΣΣ to AAA to yield XRX^RXR.

Meaning: ΣΣΣ denotes the shuffling function, transforming AAA into a uniquely shuffled set XRX^RXR for each round, enhancing unpredictability and security.

2. Witness Function and Verification: - Process: ΩΩΩ determines a target subset xiRβŠ†XRx_i^R \subseteq X^RxiRβ€‹βŠ†XR for each pip_ipi​.

Verification: Assess pip_ipi​'s presence within xiRx_i^RxiR​, denoted by MΜM.

M(pi,xiR)=trueβ€…β€ŠβŸΊβ€…β€Špi∈xiRΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} \iff p_i \in x_i^RM(pi​,xiR​)=true⟺piβ€‹βˆˆxiR​

Implication: This step authenticates each pip_ipi​ against its assigned subset, validating authenticity per round.

Accumulation: Compile outcomes of MΜM across all rounds into ΛΛΛ.

Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)\Lambda = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=R=1β‹€n​M(pi​,xiR​)

Final Proof: Validate KΚK based on the collective truth of ΛΛΛ.

Kβ‡”Ξ›Ξš \Leftrightarrow Ξ›K⇔Λ

Interpretation: ΛΛΛ embodies the cumulative verification success, with KΚK's validity contingent upon unanimous positive verifications, affirming PPP's authentication within the dynamic context of Ξ Ξ Ξ .

Theorem: The effective aggregation of verification results (ΛΛΛ) precisely reflects the comprehensive authentication of sequence PPP across all rounds (RRR), encapsulated by Ξ Ξ Ξ .

Forward Assertion: If ΛΛΛ is true, implying the aggregate of MΜM over RRR is uniformly positive, then each pip_ipi​ is verified within the correct xiRx_i^RxiR​, thus:

Ξ›=trueβ€…β€ŠβŸΉβ€…β€Šβˆ€pi∈P, M(pi,xiR)=true,β€‰βˆ€RΞ› = \text{true} \implies \forall p_i \in P, \, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}, \, \forall RΞ›=trueβŸΉβˆ€piβ€‹βˆˆP,M(pi​,xiR​)=true,βˆ€R

Backward Assertion: Conversely, if each pip_ipi​ is successfully authenticated within its designated subset xiRx_i^RxiR​ for all RRR, then ΛΛΛ must be true, encapsulating the protocol’s integrity:

β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)=true,βˆ€iβ€…β€ŠβŸΉβ€…β€ŠΞ›=true\bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}, \forall i \implies Ξ› = \text{true}R=1β‹€n​M(pi​,xiR​)=true,βˆ€iβŸΉΞ›=true

Conclusion: This delineation affirms that ΛΛΛ, as an accumulation of MΜM across rounds, serves as a robust metric for the authentication of PPP, with KΚK as the conclusive proof of knowledge, underscoring Ξ Ξ Ξ 's efficacy in sequence verification within a dynamically secure framework.

To ensure alignment with our established lemmas, axioms, constraints, and systemic framework, we refine the proof of accumulation efficacy to mirror the intricacies and specifications of our system Ξ Ξ Ξ . This revised proof elucidates the critical role of ΛΛΛ in confirming the authentication of the sequence PPP throughout all verification rounds RRR, in accordance with the operational principles and verification logic of Ξ Ξ Ξ .

Forward Assertion: Assuming ΛΛΛ holds true, indicating a universal affirmation of the verification condition MΜM across all rounds RRR, it logically follows that every element pip_ipi​ of PPP has been validated within its respective subset xiRx_i^RxiR​. This assertion can be formally captured as:

Ξ›=trueβ€…β€ŠβŸΉβ€…β€Šβˆ€pi∈P,β€‰βˆ€R, M(pi,xiR)=trueΞ› = \text{true} \implies \forall p_i \in P, \, \forall R, \, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}Ξ›=trueβŸΉβˆ€piβ€‹βˆˆP,βˆ€R,M(pi​,xiR​)=true

This implies that the integrity of ΛΛΛ as true necessitates the successful verification of every pip_ipi​ within its designated xiRx_i^RxiR​ across all rounds, ensuring the completeness and correctness of the sequence PPP authentication.

Backward Assertion: If, for each round RRR, every pip_ipi​ is affirmatively verified within its intended subset xiRx_i^RxiR​, thereby fulfilling the verification condition MΜM, then the cumulative verification result ΛΛΛ must inherently be true. This logical proposition can be succinctly expressed as:

βˆ€i,β€‰βˆ€R, M(pi,xiR)=trueβ€…β€ŠβŸΉβ€…β€ŠΞ›=true\forall i, \, \forall R, \, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} \implies Ξ› = \text{true}βˆ€i,βˆ€R,M(pi​,xiR​)=trueβŸΉΞ›=true

The sufficiency condition mandates that the aggregate verification success of all pip_ipi​ in their corresponding xiRx_i^RxiR​ for every RRR compels the truth of ΛΛΛ, encapsulating the protocol’s verification integrity and the sequential authentication's authenticity.

By analytically delineating both the forward and backward assertions, we solidify the theorem's validity, demonstrating that the truth value of ΛΛΛ—as the logical conjunction of all individual verification outcomes M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​)β€”is both necessary and sufficient for affirming the comprehensive authentication of PPP within the dynamic verification framework of Ξ Ξ Ξ . This refined proof underscores Ξ Ξ Ξ 's robust verification mechanism, ensuring PPP's integrity and validating KΚK as the definitive proof of knowledge. Through this elaboration, ΠΠΠ’s efficacy in securely authenticating sequences within a dynamically secure and algorithmically precise environment is irrefutably established, adhering to the rigorous standards set forth by our system's lemmas, axioms, and constraints.

Function to generate a shuffled alphabet from .

Function indicating the subset where is expected.

Verification condition for the presence of in .

States is validated iff is true.

Indicates the expected subset for .

,

Specifies that and are for round .

Checks if is present within subset .

Logical AND operation across all rounds .

Logical equivalence, used to relate and .

States the condition under which is considered validated.

Ξ£(A)β†’XRΞ£(A) \rightarrow X^RΞ£(A)β†’XR

Ξ©(pi)β†’xiRΞ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^RΞ©(pi​)β†’xiR​

M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​)

Kβ‡”Ξ›Ξš \Leftrightarrow Ξ›K⇔Λ

Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​)

Ξ£(A)β†’XRΞ£(A) \rightarrow X^RΞ£(A)β†’XR
XRX^RXR
AAA
Ξ©(pi)β†’xiRΞ©(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^RΞ©(pi​)β†’xiR​
xiRx_i^RxiR​
pip_ipi​
M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​)
pip_ipi​
xiRx_i^RxiR​
Kβ‡”Ξ›Ξš \Leftrightarrow Ξ›K⇔Λ
KΚK
ΛΛΛ
Ξ©(pi)Ξ©(p_i)Ξ©(pi​)
xiRx_i^RxiR​
pip_ipi​
XRX^RXR
xiRx_i^RxiR​
XRX^RXR
xiRx_i^RxiR​
RRR
M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)M(pi​,xiR​)
pip_ipi​
xiRx_i^RxiR​
Ξ›=β‹€R=1nM(pi,xiR)Ξ› = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)Ξ›=β‹€R=1n​M(pi​,xiR​)
β‹€R=1n\bigwedge_{R=1}^{n}β‹€R=1n​
RRR
k⇔Λk\Leftrightarrow Ξ›k⇔Λ
KΚK
ΛΛΛ
Kβ‡”Ξ›Ξš \Leftrightarrow Ξ›K⇔Λ
KΚK