Verification Protocol

Eni6ma Technology and the Rosario-Wang Proof/Cypher is Patent Pending. USPTO 2024. Copyright 2024 All right reserved. Eni6ma.org - Dylan Rosario

Table of Symbolic Keys

  1. Component (Π)

    • DESC: [Method] Interactive multi-round proof ceremony for sequence authentication.

  2. Alphabet (A)

    • DESC: [Member] Static set of words from which sequences are generated.

  3. Shuffled Alphabet XR X^R

    • DESC: [Member] Randomly ordered alphabet derived from A for each round R.

  4. Sequence (P)

    • DESC: [Member] Indexed array of members selected from A for verification.

  5. Subset of XRX^R ( xiRx_i^R )

    • DESC: [Variable] Specific subset of XRX^R targeted in each verification round R.

  6. Number of Subsets (n)

    • DESC: [Variable] Total subsets in X, correlating to the rounds in the verification process.

  7. Index of $P$ (δ)

    • DESC: [Variable] Index within P being verified in the current round R.

  8. Witness (Ω)

    • DESC: [Function] Indicator provided by the authenticator for the subset xiRx_i^R containing element pnp_n.

  9. Random Distribution per Round (Σ)

    • DESC: [Function] Random organization of A into XRX^R, and its division into subsets for each round R.

  10. Membership Verification per Round (Μ)

    • DESC: [Condition] Verification condition applied per round to confirm the presence of pnp_n in xiRx_i^R.

  11. Accumulation of Verification Results (Λ)

    • DESC: [Constraint] Aggregates the verification results from each round, requiring all true for Κ.

  12. Round (R)

    • DESC: [Member] Each cycle of the protocol where a new Σ is generated, and Μ is verified against xiRx_i^R.

  13. Proof of Knowledge (Κ)

    • DESC: [Result] The final validation, confirming the authenticator's knowledge of sequence P.


Axioms and Lemmas

Axioms

  1. Axiom of Initialization:

    • Equation: P = {p_1, p_2, ..., p_n}, XR=Σ(A)X^R = Σ(A) for R=1,2,...,nR = 1, 2, ..., n.

    • Expression: This axiom establishes the protocol $Π$ begins with a predefined sequence PP, consisting of elements p1 p_1 to pnp_n, and a static alphabet A. For each verification round R, a shuffled version of A, denoted as XRX^R, is produced through the shuffling function Σ, ensuring fresh and unpredictable challenges in each round.

  2. Axiom of Random Distribution:

    • Equation: XR=Σ(A)X^R = Σ(A) , ensuring XRXRX^R \neq X^{R'} for RRR \neq R' .

    • Expression: This asserts that each round RR of the protocol generates a uniquely shuffled alphabet XRX^R from A, via Σ. The condition XRXRX^R \neq X^{R'} for differing rounds ensures that the sequence of challenges is non-repetitive and unpredictable, fundamental for securing the verification process.

  3. Axiom of Sequence Verification:

    • Equation: Existence of xiRx_i^R such that pixiRp_i \in x_i^R for each pip_i in P.

    • Expression: For every element pi p_i within the sequence P, there exists a targeted subset xiR x_i^R within the shuffled alphabet XRX^R where pip_i can be found and verified. This axiom underscores the protocol's capacity to pinpoint and verify individual sequence elements.

  4. Axiom of Completeness:

    • Equation: piP,xiRXR:M(pi,xiR)=true\forall p_i \in P, \exists x_i^R \in X^R : Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} .

    • Expression: Signifies that for all elements pip_i within P, there must be a subset xiR x_i^R in XRX^R for which the verification condition $Μ$ returns true, ensuring every element of $P$ is verified throughout the protocol's execution.

  5. Axiom of Non-collision:

    • Equation: Unique generation of XRX^R and xiRx_i^R, preventing collisions.

    • Expression: Guarantees that the generation process for XRX^R and its subsets xiRx_i^R produces unique configurations, ensuring the integrity of the verification process by avoiding identical shuffles or subsets across different rounds.

Lemmas

  1. Lemma of Witness Validity:

    • Equation: Ω(pi)xiRM(pi,xiR)=trueΩ(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R \land Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} .

    • Expression: States that if the witness function Ω accurately identifies the subset xiRx_i^R for an element pip_i, and the verification MΜ confirms pip_i's presence in xiRx_i^R, then pip_i's verification for that round is deemed valid.

  2. Lemma of Comprehensive Verification:

    • Equation: R=1nM(pi,xiR)P authenticated\bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow P \text{ authenticated} .

    • Expression: Indicates that the sequence $P$ is fully authenticated against the shuffled alphabet XRX^R if, for all rounds R, the verification condition MΜ for each pip_i within its respective subset xiRx_i^R holds true.

  3. Lemma of Accumulative Proof:

    • Equation: Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)K=trueΛ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow Κ = \text{true}.

    • Expression: Explains that the final proof of knowledge KΚ is validated if the accumulator ΛΛ, which aggregates all verification outcomes MΜ across rounds RR, is true. This encapsulates the protocol's integrity by affirming the sequence PP's authentication through cumulative verification success.

  4. Lemma of Dynamic Adaptability:

    • Equation: Adaptation to varying P|P| and A|A| without loss of ΠΠ integrity.

    • Expression: Asserts that the protocol ΠΠ can flexibly adjust to different sizes of the sequence PP and alphabet AA without compromising its verification integrity or security, demonstrating ΠΠ's scalability and adaptability.

  5. Lemma of Security Enhancement:

    • Equation: Enhanced security through unpredictability, Σ(A)XRΣ(A) \rightarrow X^R.

    • Expression: Highlights that security against cryptographic and brute-force threats is significantly enhanced by the unpredictability factor introduced through the shuffling function ΣΣ, creating a dynamic and secure verification environment.

Constraints with Expressive Statements

  1. Constraint of Round Completeness:

    • Equation: R,M(pi,xiR) must complete\forall R, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \text{ must complete}.

    • Expression: This constraint mandates that in every round RR, the verification process MΜ for each element pip_i within its designated subset xiRx_i^R must be fully executed, ensuring no part of the verification cycle is left incomplete.

  2. Constraint of Subset Uniqueness:

    • Equation: xiRxjRx_i^R \neq x_j^{R'} for RRR \neq R' or iji \neq j.

    • Expression: To maintain the integrity of the verification process, each subset xiRx_i^R generated for a round RR must be unique. This prevents any potential overlap or repetition of subsets across different rounds, reinforcing the security and robustness of ΠΠ.

  3. Constraint of Proof Consistency:

    • Equation: Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)K=trueΛ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \Rightarrow Κ = \text{true}.

    • Expression: The validation of the proof of knowledge KΚ hinges on the consistent truth of all verification outcomes MΜ aggregated in ΛΛ. This ensures that KΚ is declared true only if every element pip_i of PP is successfully verified across all rounds RR.

  4. Constraint of Witness Integrity:

    • Equation: Ω(pi) must be verifiable against PΩ(p_i) \text{ must be verifiable against } P.

    • Expression: The witness ΩΩ, indicating where an element pip_i should be found within XRX^R, must be reliably linked to the prover's knowledge of the sequence PP. This guards against misleading or incorrect indications that could compromise the verification integrity.

  5. Constraint of Verification Transparency:

    • Equation: M(pi,xiR)K must be externally verifiableΜ(p_i, x_i^R) \land Κ \text{ must be externally verifiable}.

    • Expression: The process underscores the necessity for both the verification outcomes MΜ and the final proof KΚ to be transparent and amenable to external verification. This openness fosters trust and verifiability in the authentication process implemented by ΠΠ.

Principles with Expressive Statements

  • Principle of Sequential Integrity:

    • Equation: Orderly M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R) preserves PP integrity.

    • Expression: The orderly execution of verification MΜ for elements within PP, following the sequence integrity, ensures the robustness of the authentication process, guaranteeing that each step follows logically from the previous one without breaches in logical continuity.

  • Principle of Protocol Security:

    • Equation: Σ(A)R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λsecure ΠΣ(A) \land \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) \land Λ \Rightarrow \text{secure } Π.

    • Expression: The security of the protocol ΠΠ is reinforced through the combination of unpredictable shuffling (ΣΣ), thorough verification (MΜ) across all rounds, and the cumulative confirmation (ΛΛ) of these verifications, creating a robust defense against unauthorized access and manipulation.

  • Principle of Verifiability:

    • Equation: External verification of MKΜ \land Κ.

    • Expression: Emphasizes the protocol's capacity for its verification steps and the final proof to be validated by third parties, enhancing the overall credibility and trustworthiness of ΠΠ.

  • Principle of Non-repudiation:

    • Equation: ΛΛ documents verification, preventing denial.

    • Expression: The documentation and aggregation of verification results in ΛΛ serve as a solid foundation for non-repudiation, ensuring that once an authentication claim is made, it cannot be denied or disputed.

Systemic Implications with Expressive Statements

  • Implication of Continuity:

    • Equation: ΠΠ mechanism for re-verification or secure termination after failure.

    • Expression: This ensures that ΠΠ includes mechanisms to either allow for the re-verification of elements upon failure or to securely terminate the session, safeguarding the integrity of the process and preventing potential security breaches.

  • Implication of Evolution:

    • Equation: ΠΠ updates to cryptographic methods without negating past validations.

    • Expression: ΠΠ is designed to be future-proof, permitting updates and enhancements to its cryptographic methodologies without invalidating previously authenticated sequences. This adaptability ensures that ΠΠ remains relevant and secure in the face of evolving cryptographic landscapes.


Rosario-Wang Proof Protocol

Initialization of the Protocol (Π)

  1. Protocol Initialization:

    • Let ΠΠ denote the entire proof of knowledge protocol.

    • AA represents the static alphabet from which sequences are generated.

    • P=p1,p2,,pnP = {p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n} is the sequence to be authenticated, with pip_i being the ii-th element of PP.

Preparation of the Alphabet and Shuffled Alphabet

  1. Alphabet Preparation and Shuffling:

    • XRX^R represents the shuffled alphabet derived from AA for round RR, where R=1,2,,nR = 1, 2, \ldots, n.

    • The shuffling process per round is defined by Σ(A)XRΣ(A) \rightarrow X^R, ensuring each XRX^R is a unique permutation of AA.

Generation of the Sequence and its Verification

  1. Sequence Generation and Subset Selection:

    • For each round RR, a subset xiRXRx_i^R \subseteq X^R is targeted for verification. Here, ii corresponds to the targeted index within PP for that round.

    • The selection of xiRx_i^R for a given piPp_i \in P is guided by a witness ΩΩ, which indicates the appropriate subset xiRx_i^R where pip_i should be found.

Verification Process

  1. Verification and Witness:

    • The verification condition for round RR is denoted as M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R), checking if pip_i is present within xiRx_i^R.

    • The witness Ω(pi)xiRΩ(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R links pip_i to its corresponding subset xiRx_i^R for verification.

Result Accumulation and Proof of Knowledge

  1. Result Accumulation and Conclusion:

    • The accumulation of verification results across all rounds RR is captured by Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R), where ΛΛ is true iff all instances of $Μ$ are true.

    • The final proof of knowledge, KΚ, is validated iff ΛΛ is true, denoted mathematically as KΛΚ \Leftrightarrow Λ.

Notational Summary

  • ΠΠ: The multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony.

  • AA: The static alphabet.

  • PP: The sequence to be authenticated.

  • XRX^R: The shuffled alphabet for round RR.

  • xiRx_i^R: The subset of XRX^R targeted in round RR.

  • ΣΣ: The random distribution function that generates XRX^R from AA.

  • ΩΩ: The witness function that indicates the subset xiRx_i^R for verification of pip_i.

  • MΜ: The verification condition for a member pip_i in subset xiRx_i^R.

  • ΛΛ: The accumulator of verification results across rounds.

  • KΚ: The final proof of knowledge, affirming the authenticity of PP.


  1. Protocol and Sequence Declaration:

    • ΠΠ: Proof of knowledge protocol.

    • P=p1,p2,,pnP = {p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n}: Sequence to be authenticated.

  2. Alphabet and Shuffling:

    • AA: Static alphabet.

    • XR=Σ(A)X^R = Σ(A): Shuffled alphabet XX for round RR, obtained by applying the shuffling function ΣΣ to A.

  3. Subset Selection and Verification:

    • xiRx_i^R : Subset of XRX^R targeted in round RR for verifying element pip_i.

    • Ω(pi)xiRΩ(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R: Witness function indicating the subset xiRx_i^R where pip_i is expected to be found for verification.

  4. Verification Condition:

    • M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R): Verification condition for round RR, checking if pip_i is present within xiRx_i^R.

  5. Result Accumulation and Proof of Knowledge:

    • Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R): Accumulator of verification results across all rounds RR, where ΛΛ is true if and only if all instances of MΜ are true.

    • KΛΚ \Leftrightarrow Λ: The final proof of knowledge KΚ is validated if and only if ΛΛ is true.


Mathematical Formulation

In the context of the multi-round proof of knowledge ceremony ($Π$), operating over a sequence $P$ derived from a static alphabet $A$, we formalize the operations, verification, and the final synthesis of proof through a detailed mathematical exposition, ensuring clarity and alignment with foundational principles.

Protocol Operation and Verification Rounds

  1. Initialization and Shuffling:

    • Given: P=p1,p2,,pnP = {p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n} and AA as inputs.

    • Operation: For each verification round RR, apply ΣΣ to AA to yield XRX^R.

    Meaning: ΣΣ denotes the shuffling function, transforming AA into a uniquely shuffled set XRX^R for each round, enhancing unpredictability and security.

2. Witness Function and Verification: - Process: ΩΩ determines a target subset xiRXRx_i^R \subseteq X^R for each pip_i.

Verification: Assess pip_i's presence within xiRx_i^R, denoted by MΜ.

M(pi,xiR)=true    pixiRΜ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} \iff p_i \in x_i^R

Implication: This step authenticates each pip_i against its assigned subset, validating authenticity per round.

Accumulation of Verification Results

  1. Results Accumulation and Proof Validation:

    • Accumulation: Compile outcomes of MΜ across all rounds into ΛΛ.

Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)\Lambda = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)

Final Proof: Validate KΚ based on the collective truth of ΛΛ.

KΛΚ \Leftrightarrow Λ

Interpretation: ΛΛ embodies the cumulative verification success, with KΚ's validity contingent upon unanimous positive verifications, affirming PP's authentication within the dynamic context of ΠΠ.

Proof of Accumulation Efficacy

Theorem: The effective aggregation of verification results (ΛΛ) precisely reflects the comprehensive authentication of sequence PP across all rounds (RR), encapsulated by ΠΠ.

Forward Assertion: If ΛΛ is true, implying the aggregate of MΜ over RR is uniformly positive, then each pip_i is verified within the correct xiRx_i^R, thus:

Λ=true    piP,M(pi,xiR)=true,RΛ = \text{true} \implies \forall p_i \in P, \, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}, \, \forall R

Backward Assertion: Conversely, if each pip_i is successfully authenticated within its designated subset xiRx_i^R for all RR, then ΛΛ must be true, encapsulating the protocol’s integrity:

R=1nM(pi,xiR)=true,i    Λ=true\bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}, \forall i \implies Λ = \text{true}

Conclusion: This delineation affirms that ΛΛ, as an accumulation of MΜ across rounds, serves as a robust metric for the authentication of PP, with KΚ as the conclusive proof of knowledge, underscoring ΠΠ's efficacy in sequence verification within a dynamically secure framework.

To ensure alignment with our established lemmas, axioms, constraints, and systemic framework, we refine the proof of accumulation efficacy to mirror the intricacies and specifications of our system ΠΠ. This revised proof elucidates the critical role of ΛΛ in confirming the authentication of the sequence PP throughout all verification rounds RR, in accordance with the operational principles and verification logic of ΠΠ.

Extended Proof of Accumulation Efficacy

Theorem: The accumulator $Λ$, through the effective aggregation of verification results, accurately represents the thorough authentication of the sequence $P$ across every round $R$ within the protocol $Π$.

Refined Assertions

Forward Assertion: Assuming ΛΛ holds true, indicating a universal affirmation of the verification condition MΜ across all rounds RR, it logically follows that every element pip_i of PP has been validated within its respective subset xiRx_i^R. This assertion can be formally captured as:

Λ=true    piP,R,M(pi,xiR)=trueΛ = \text{true} \implies \forall p_i \in P, \, \forall R, \, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true}

This implies that the integrity of ΛΛ as true necessitates the successful verification of every pip_i within its designated xiRx_i^R across all rounds, ensuring the completeness and correctness of the sequence PP authentication.

Backward Assertion: If, for each round RR, every pip_i is affirmatively verified within its intended subset xiRx_i^R, thereby fulfilling the verification condition MΜ, then the cumulative verification result ΛΛ must inherently be true. This logical proposition can be succinctly expressed as:

i,R,M(pi,xiR)=true    Λ=true\forall i, \, \forall R, \, Μ(p_i, x_i^R) = \text{true} \implies Λ = \text{true}

The sufficiency condition mandates that the aggregate verification success of all pip_i in their corresponding xiRx_i^R for every RR compels the truth of ΛΛ, encapsulating the protocol’s verification integrity and the sequential authentication's authenticity.

Conclusion

By analytically delineating both the forward and backward assertions, we solidify the theorem's validity, demonstrating that the truth value of ΛΛ—as the logical conjunction of all individual verification outcomes M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)—is both necessary and sufficient for affirming the comprehensive authentication of PP within the dynamic verification framework of ΠΠ. This refined proof underscores ΠΠ's robust verification mechanism, ensuring PP's integrity and validating KΚ as the definitive proof of knowledge. Through this elaboration, ΠΠ’s efficacy in securely authenticating sequences within a dynamically secure and algorithmically precise environment is irrefutably established, adhering to the rigorous standards set forth by our system's lemmas, axioms, and constraints.

Table of Functions and Operators

Following key of operators

Function/OperatorSymbol/NotationDescription

Shuffled

Σ(A)XRΣ(A) \rightarrow X^R

Function to generate a shuffled alphabet XRX^R from AA.

Indicating

Ω(pi)xiRΩ(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R

Function indicating the subset xiRx_i^R where pip_i is expected.

Verifying

M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)

Verification condition for the presence of pip_i in xiRx_i^R.

Authenticated

KΛΚ \Leftrightarrow Λ

States KΚ is validated iff ΛΛ is true.

Expected

Ω(pi)Ω(p_i)

Indicates the expected subset xiRx_i^R for pip_i.

For Round

XRX^R, xiRx_i^R

Specifies that XRX^R and xiRx_i^R are for round RR.

Present Within

M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)

Checks if pip_i is present within subset xiRx_i^R.

Accumulator

Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)

Accumulates verification results across all rounds.

Across All Rounds

R=1n\bigwedge_{R=1}^{n}

Logical AND operation across all rounds RR.

Is True If and Only If

kΛk\Leftrightarrow Λ

Logical equivalence, used to relate KΚ and ΛΛ.

Validated If

KΛΚ \Leftrightarrow Λ

States the condition under which KΚ is considered validated.

List of Equations

  1. Shuffling Function:

    • Σ(A)XRΣ(A) \rightarrow X^R

  2. Indicating Function:

    • Ω(pi)xiRΩ(p_i) \rightarrow x_i^R

  3. Verification Condition:

    • M(pi,xiR)Μ(p_i, x_i^R)

  4. Authentication Relation:

    • KΛΚ \Leftrightarrow Λ

  5. Accumulation of Results:

    • Λ=R=1nM(pi,xiR)Λ = \bigwedge_{R=1}^{n} Μ(p_i, x_i^R)

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